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Was  This  Recession  Dij,ferent? 
Are  They  All  Dij,ferent? 
THE  RECENT  RECESSION and disappointing  recovery have renewed in- 
terest in the cyclical behavior  of the economy. The latest recession was 
the eighth  in the last forty years. Each has involved massive  job losses 
and sharply  reduced  rates of capital  formation.  Each has also reduced 
the inflation  rate, although  not always for long. The leading  candidates 
for explaining  these episodes are variations  in fiscal and monetary  poli- 
cies, shocks to the economy from exogenous developments  apart  from 
policy, the internal  dynamics  of the economy, and  combinations  of some 
or all of these factors. 
In this paper  we attempt  to answer a number  of questions about the 
recent recession and its predecessors. Are recessions generically  spe- 
cial in the sense that  economic  relations  are  different  in some systematic 
way? If they are different  from  nonrecession  periods, what  are the fam- 
ily resemblances  among  recessions and  in what  ways have they differed 
from each other? In particular,  how was the latest recession different 
from others, either in how economic activity unfolded  and reacted to 
policy, in how policy changed  in reaction  to economic developments, 
in what brought  on the recession, or in what made the initial  stages of 
recovery  so weak?  Have financial  developments  played  a special  role in 
the  latest  recession  and  the weak  recovery  from  it? How potent  are  fiscal 
and  monetary  policies around  recessions, how much  of the variations  in 
output  do they explain, and  how much  is left to be explained  by shocks? 
The paper has three main parts. First, we undertake  a comparative 
analysis  of the behavior  and interaction  of the main  components  of out- 
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put and major  policy variables  around  recessions. Second, we look at 
some unusual  developments,  particularly  in employment,  that  may help 
explain  some of the recent  weakness in the recovery. Third,  we examine 
whether  financial  developments-in  particular,  bank capital shortages 
and  business balance  sheet problems-played a special role in inducing 
the latest recession or hindering  its recovery. 
A Comparative  Analysis of Recession and Recovery 
We first  summarize  the actual  behavior  of output  and  policy variables 
in the six recessions and  then turn  to how much  of this behavior  is a sur- 
prise, not readily  explained  by relatively simple econometric  relations 
among  the variables.  Our  analysis  is based  primarily  on the last six U.S. 
recessions, counting the 1980-82 period as one recession, as we do 
throughout  the paper, although  the National Bureau  of Economic Re- 
search  (NBER) count breaks  it into two. We did not go back in time be- 
fore  the mid-  1950s  because  the two previous  recessions took  place in the 
aftermath  of wars  and  with  the economy awash  in liquidity,  so their  rele- 
vance for today appeared  limited. 
The Broad Aggregates 
Table 1 shows changes  in gross domestic  product,  final  sales, and in- 
ventory  accumulation  relative  to the trend  in potential  GDP, expressed 
as a percent  of potential  GDP. The changes  are shown  for the period  be- 
fore, during,  and  after  the six recessions. We use these three  subperiods 
throughout  the paper, showing  performance  during  recoveries both af- 
ter five quarters,  when the latest recovery  was exceptionally  weak, and 
after seven quarters,  which is the latest period  for which we have data 
on the most recent recovery.  ' The standard  deviations  shown in the ta- 
ble for each subperiod  refer to the dispersion of performance  for the 
subperiod  across the six recessions. We organize our main analysis 
1. For  our  measure  of potential  (high  employment  or  trend)  GDP,  we used  unpublished 
quarterly  estimates  as calculated  by the Congressional  Budget  Office  (CBO).  Although  we 
would  estimate  potential  output  somewhat  differently  (in particular,  we would place the 
level of potential  higher  than the CBO series in the earlier  years under  review), we are 
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Table 1. Gross  Domestic  Product,  Final  Sales, and Inventory  Investment  around 
Recessions 
Change  as percent  of potential  GDP 
Interval 
(P-4)  T to  T to  P to  T 
Category  Recession  to P  P to  T  (T+5)  (T+7)  (a.r.) 
Gross  domestic  1957:3-1958:2  -0.7  -5.8  3.9  4.2  -7.7 
product  1960:2-1961:1  -1.9  -2.0  2.7  1.6  -2.7 
1969:4-1970:4  -1.8  -3.8  1.5  3.1  -3.8 
1973:4-1975:1  0.1  -8.8  2.7  3.0  -7.0 
1980:1-1982:4  -2.0  -7.9  5.3  6.1  -2.9 
1990:3-1991:1  -1.2  -2.9  -0.6  0.6  -5.9 
Mean  (excluding  1990-91)  -1.3  -5.7  3.2  3.6  -4.8 
Mean  -1.3  -5.2  2.6  3.1  -5.0 
Standard  deviation  0.7  2.5  1.8  1.8  2.0 
1990-91,  less mean  others  0.0  2.7  -3.8  -3.0  - 1.0 
Final sales  1957:3-1958:2  -0.6  -4.6  3.3  2.1  -6.2 
1960:2-1961:1  - 1.0  -1.3  1.6  0.8  -1.7 
1969:4-1970:4  -2.1  -3.0  0.8  1.9  -3.0 
1973:4-1975:1  -1.2  -6.0  1.0  1.8  -4.8 
1980:1-1982:4  -1.6  -6.5  2.5  3.4  -2.4 
1990:3-1991:1  - 1.1  -2.2  -1.2  -0.1  -4.4 
Mean  (excluding  1990-91)  -1.3  -4.3  1.8  2.0  -3.6 
Mean  -1.2  -3.9  1.3  1.6  -3.7 
Standard  deviation  0.5  1.9  1.4  1.1  1.5 
1990-91,  less mean  others  0.1  2.1  -3.1  - 2.1  -0.8 
Inventory  1957:3-1958:2  -0.2  -1.1  0.6  2.0  -1.5 
investment  1960:2-1961:1  -0.9  -0.8  1.1  0.7  -  1.0 
1969:4-1970:4  0.2  -0.8  0.7  1.2  -0.8 
1973:4-1975:1  1.3  - 2.8  1.8  1.2  -2.2 
1980:1-1982:4  -0.4  - 1.4  2.8  2.7  -0.5 
1990:3-1991:1  - 0.1  -0.7  0.7  0.7  - 1.5 
Mean  (excluding  1990-91)  0.0  -1.4  1.4  1.6  -1.2 
Mean  0.0  -1.3  1.3  1.4  -1.3 
Standard  deviation  0.7  0.7  0.8  0.7  0.6 
1990-91,  less mean  others  -0.1  0.6  -0.7  -0.9  -0.3 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based on the National  Income and Product  Accounts (NIPA) and unpublished 
Congressional  Budget  Office  (CBO)  estimates. 
using  these subperiods  because  we suspect  it is useful  to view recessions 
as episodes in which economic relations are somewhat changed from 
other  periods, a suspicion  that is supported  by regressions  reported  be- 
low. We use the official dating  of recessions because it is broadly ac- 
cepted. 
During the average recession, GDP fell by 5.2 percent relative to 
trend,  or by an annual  rate  of 5.0 percent.  GDP  is more  cyclical than  final 148  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
sales, reflecting  the procyclical  behavior  of inventories  over these inter- 
vals. Only in the period  directly  preceding  the recession of 1973  did in- 
ventories  play a significant,  although  temporary,  role in buffering  GDP 
against  a final  sales decline. In the current  recovery, however, a rise in 
inventory  accumulation  has caused GDP to rise relative to trend at a 
time when final  sales were still losing ground.  The standard  deviation  of 
GDP is substantially  higher  than that of final sales before, during,  and 
after  recessions. At 1.8 percent  of GDP, the standard  deviation  for the 
first  seven quarters  of recoveries  is high  enough  to discredit  the idea  that 
all recoveries-even  before  the latest one-look  alike. 
The  most striking  regularity  revealed  in table 1  is the weakness  of final 
sales in the four quarters  preceding  cyclical peaks, with a mean decline 
relative  to trend  of 1.3  percent  and  a standard  deviation  of only 0.5. The 
latest recession is very near the average. This weakness in final sales 
over the four  quarters  leading  up to recession comes close to being  a fea- 
ture of the economy that predicts recessions. Figure 1 examines final 
sales relative  to trend  over all four-quarter  intervals.  Only  from  late 1966 
to early 1967  did the four-quarter  sum  turn  clearly  negative  without  pre- 
saging  a recession. At that  time, the investment  tax credit  had  been sus- 
pended  in the fall of 1966  to cool off the economy, only to be reinstituted 
the following  winter  in response  to worries  that  the economy was weak- 
ening  too much. 
There  is considerably  more  dispersion  across recessions  from  peak  to 
trough  and even during  the quarters  of recovery. However, the current 
recovery  is the only one in which the increase  in final  sales did not keep 
up with  trend,  even after  seven quarters.  In the five previous  recoveries, 
final  sales rose relative  to trend  by an average  of 2.0 percent. Measured 
after  five quarters,  the current  recovery  was 3. 1  percent  behind  the aver- 
age of the five previous  recoveries. 
During  the average  recovery, final  sales account for only 52 percent 
of the rise in GDP  relative  to trend  (compared  with  more  than  99 percent 
over all recession and nonrecession  periods);  the percent is similar  for 
all recoveries except the last one. This regularity  exists alongside the 
considerable  variation  in the growth  of both GDP and final  sales during 
recoveries. The contribution  of inventory investment to recoveries is 
not only large,  but has a quite  low standard  error  and, in a cross-section 
across recoveries, a remarkable  correlation  of 0.91 with final  sales over 
the first seven quarters.  During  recessions this correlation  is 0.72 and George L. Perry and Charles L. Schultze  149 
Figure 1.  Percentage Change in Final Sales Relative to Potential GDP, Four-Quarter 
Moving Suma 
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Source:  Authors' calculations  based on National Income and Product Accounts  (NIPA)  and unpublished Congres- 
sional Budget Office (CBO) estimates. 
a.  Vertical lines  are NBER-dated  business  cycle  peak quarters. 
during  the four quarters  preceding  peaks it is  -0.17,  suggesting  that 
there may have been unintended  accumulation  of stocks before some 
cyclical peaks. 
We draw  several inferences  from  these patterns.  Recessions are sys- 
tematically  preceded  by weakness in the growth  of final  sales, but  not by 
the contribution  of inventory investment to production.  Even if unin- 
tended accumulation  of stocks has occurred  before peaks, recessions 
must typically originate  elsewhere, with inventory  buildups  slightly  al- 
tering  the timing  of peaks. Weakening  final  sales leading  up to recession 
could reflect exogenous shocks or may be the intended  or unintended 
result of policy changes. They may also reflect some endogenous dy- 
namics  of the economy that  are not offset by policy adjustments. 
After peaks, the endogenous dynamics of the economy seem to be 
more important.  The correlation  between final sales in the year before 
recessions  and  final  sales during  recessions is less than  0.1. The correla- 
tion between the depth of the recession and strength  of the recovery is 
-0.48  after five quarters  and -0.81  after seven quarters.  These nega- 
tive correlations  would be consistent with some accelerator  models de- 
scribing  the dynamics  of the economy, but would not be predicted  if the 
economy's motion  were characterized  by a random  walk  with drift.  The 
very high  correlation  between the contribution  of final  sales and inven- 
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in a systematic way to final sales during  this period. Inventory  imbal- 
ances are corrected  quickly, but adjusting  output  to correct them adds 
substantially  to the size of the downturn  and, even more, to the strength 
of the recovery. 
Components  of Final  Sales 
Table 2 provides  a more disaggregated  view by examining  the major 
components  of final  sales around  recessions. For each component, the 
table shows its change relative  to trend, as a percent  of potential  GDP. 
Thus, except for rounding,  the changes  add to the changes  in final  sales 
relative  to trend  shown  in table 1, and  the change  shown  for each compo- 
nent shows its contribution  to the percent change in GDP relative to 
trend  during  the period.2  We should  emphasize  that, because the entries 
are scaled to show their  contribution  to potential  GDP, table 2 provides 
little sense of the actual volatility of demand  in some of these sectors. 
For example,  expressed  as a percent  of themselves rather  than  of poten- 
tial  GDP, the changes  in nonresidential  construction  would  be thirty-five 
times as large,  the changes  in residential  construction  would  be twenty- 
five times as large, and the changes in consumer durables  would be 
eleven times as large as the entries in the table. Where  it simplifies  the 
following discussions, consumption  (or other components) measured 
relative  to trend  will be referred  to as relative  consumption  (or relative 
other  components). 
CONSUMPTION.  As Christopher  D. Carroll  and Robert  E. Hall have 
recently observed, the variation  in consumption  around  recessions is 
considerably  greater  than  a simple  permanent  income model would  pre- 
dict.3  Relative consumption  declined  before each recession and, on av- 
erage, accounted  for 58 percent of the decline in relative  final sales. It 
declined  in every recession, accounting  for 49 percent of the decline in 
final  sales, and  rose in every recovery, more  than  accounting  for the rise 
in final  sales. After seven quarters,  consumption  on average  had almost 
made  up for its decline relative  to trend  in the recession, but not for the 
2. Letting  X be a component,  Q be GDP,  and  an asterisk  designate  the potential  levels 
of a variable,  the entries  in table  2 are calculated  as Aln(XIQ*)XIQ*.  Assuming  the poten- 
tial  growth  in each component  equals  the potential  growth  in GDP, this  expression  equals 
(AlnX- AlnX*)XIQ*,  which  is approximately  (AX- AX*)/Q*. 
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decline  in the year  preceding  the recession. Shocks to consumption  may 
have contributed  to causing  recessions. But the systematically  procycli- 
cal behavior  of relative  consumption  over all three subperiods  in all re- 
cessions suggests  its behavior  is mainly  endogenous  to the recession ex- 
perience. Consumption  responds  promptly  to the ups and downs of the 
overall  economy, driven  by short-run  variations  in income, confidence, 
interest  rates, or some other developments  characteristic  of recession- 
ary episodes. 
RESIDENTIAL  CONSTRUCTION.  Although the lead of  residential 
construction  downturns  relative to business cycle peaks has long been 
recognized, we were still surprised  by the regularity  of this behavior 
shown in table 2. On average, this small sector accounts  for 58 percent 
of the shortfall  of final  sales relative  to trend  in the year  preceding  reces- 
sions, and  the mean  change  of - 0.7 percent  of potential  GDP  has a stan- 
dard  error  of only 0.2 percent across the six prerecession  periods. The 
mean decline is only slightly greater  during  recession, although  it ac- 
counts for much less of the mean decline in GDP or final sales and the 
standard  error  is more  than  four  times as large.  Residential  construction 
is also strongly  procyclical  during  recoveries, accounting  for about  two- 
thirds  of the increase in final sales. The behavior  of this sector is obvi- 
ously tied closely to the movement  of interest  rates over the cycle. It is 
interesting  that residential  construction  has been as cyclical in the later 
recessions-when  the end of deposit ceilings had loosened the channel 
of influence  through  disintermediation  and variable  rate mortgages  had 
been introduced-as it had  been in earlier  recessions, when  interest  rate 
ceilings  on time deposits were such an important  feature  of the financial 
scene. 
PRODUCERS'  DURABLE  EQUIPMENT.  Expenditures  by businesses 
on equipment  show no systematic cyclical pattern  leading  up to reces- 
sions, although  they are systematically  procyclical  during  recession and 
recovery. During  recession, on average, they have accounted  for one- 
quarter  of the decline in final sales, and with a low standard  deviation 
across recessions. 
NONRESIDENTIAL  STRUCTURES.  Business expenditures  on nonres- 
idential  structures  are in step with the cycle in overall final sales only 
during  the recession quarters.  On  average,  and  in most of the recessions 
studied,  nonresidential  structures  outlays  were still  rising  in the year  be- 
fore the recession when total final  sales were declining  relative  to trend, 152  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Table  2. Components  of Final  Sales  around  Recessions 
Change as percent of potential GDP 
Interval 
(P-4)  T to  T to  P toT 
Component  Recession  to P  P to T  (T+5)  (T+ 7)  (a.r.) 
Personal  1957:3-1958:2  -0.5  -1.5  2.2  1.6  -  2.0 
consumption  1960:2-1961:1  -0.1  -1  .4  0.6  0.8  -1.8 
expenditures  1969:4-1970:4  -0.3  -  1.2  1.1  2.2  -1.2 
1973:4-1975:1  -  1.1  -3.3  1.9  2.5  -2.7 
1980:1-1982:4  -1.4  -2.0  2.3  2.8  -0.7 
1990:3-1991:1  -0.6  - 1.8  -0.4  0.4  - 3.6 
Mean (excluding 1990-91)  -0.7  -  1.9  1.6  2.0  -  1.7 
Mean  -0.7  -1.9  1.3  1.7  - 2.0 
Standard  deviation  0.4  0.7  0.9  0.9  0.9 
1990-91, less mean others  0.0  0.1  -2.0  - 1.5  - 2.0 
Residential  1957:3-1958:2  -0.6  -0.4  1.3  1.2  -0.5 
fixed  1960:2-1961:1  -0.9  -0.3  0.5  0.4  -0.4 
investment  1969:4-1970:4  -0.5  0.2  1.3  1.3  0.2 
1973:4-1975:1  -  1.0  -2.3  0.8  1.2  -  1.9 
1980:1-1982:4  -  1.0  -2.0  1.2  1.2  -0.7 
1990:3-1991:1  -0.6  -0.6  0.4  0.6  -1.2 
Mean (excluding 1990-91)  -0.8  -0.9  1.0  1.0  --0.6 
Mean  -0.7  -0.9  0.9  1.0  -0.7 
Standard  deviation  0.2  0.9  0.4  0.4  0.7 
1990-91, less mean others  0.2  0.3  -0.6  -0.5  -0.5 
Producers'  1957:3-1958:2  - 0.0  -1 .2  0.5  0.5  -1.6 
durable  1960:2-1961:1  0.1  -0.7  0.5  0.3  -0.9 
equipment  1969:4-1970:4  -0.1  -0.5  0.2  0.5  -0.5 
1973:4-1975:1  0.5  -1.3  -0.1  0.1  -  1.0 
1980:1-1982:4  -0.4  - 1.6  0.9  1.3  -0.6 
1990:3-1991:1  -0.2  -0.5  0.3  0.6  -  1.1 
Mean (excluding 1990-91)  0.0  -1.1  0.4  0.5  -0.9 
Mean  0.0  -1.0  0.4  0.6  -1.0 
Standard  deviation  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.4 
1990-91, less mean others  -0.2  0.5  -0.1  0.1  -0.1 
Nonresidential  1957:3-1958:2  -0.2  -0.3  0.1  0.1  -0.5 
structures  1960:2-1961:1  0.2  0.1  -0.0  -0.1  0.1 
1969:4-1970:4  0.1  -0.3  -0.1  -0.1  -0.3 
1973:4-1975:1  0.2  -0.7  -0.2  -0.2  -0.6 
1980:1-1982:4  0.3  -0.3  -0.1  0.2  -0.1 
1990:3-1991:1  - 0.0  -0.3  -0.5  -0.6  -0.7 
Mean (excluding 1990-91)  0.1  -0.3  -0.1  0.0  -0.3 
Mean  0.1  -0.3  -0.1  -0.1  -0.3 
Standard  deviation  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3 
1990-91, less mean others  -0.1  0.0  -0.4  -0.6  -0.4 George L. Perry and Charles L. Schultze  153 
Table 2.  (continued) 
Change as percent of potential GDP 
Interval 
(P-4)  T to  T to  P toT 
Component  Recession  to P  P to T  (T+S)  (T+ 7)  (a.r.) 
Imports  1957:3-1958:2  0.1  -0.2  -0.3  -0.2  -0.3 
(sign reversed)  1960:2-1961:1  0.1  0.5  -0.4  -0.4  0.6 
1969:4-1970:4  -0.2  0.1  -0.7  -0.5  0.1 
1973:4-1975:1  0.1  1.4  -0.7  -  1.1  1.1 
1980:1-1982:4  0.1  0.7  -2.0  -2.5  0.3 
1990:3-1991:1  -0.1  0.8  -  1.1  -1.5  1.7 
Mean (excluding 1990-91)  0.1  0.5  -0.8  -0.8  0.4 
Mean  0.0  0.6  -0.9  -0.9  0.6 
Standard  deviation  0.1  0.5  0.6  0.9  0.7 
1990-91, less mean others  -0.2  0.3  -0.3  -0.8  1.3 
Exports  1957:3-1958:2  0.1  -0.8  0.1  0.4  -1.0 
1960:2-1961:1  0.6  0.0  0.1  - 0.1  0.0 
1969:4-1970:4  0.2  0.1  - 0.0  0.1  0.1 
1973:4-1975:1  0.8  0.1  -0.1  0.1  0.1 
1980:1-1982:4  0.6  -  1.6  0.2  0.4  -0.6 
1990:3-1991:1  0.5  0.0  0.6  1.0  0.1 
Mean (excluding 1990-91)  0.5  -0.4  0.1  0.2  -0.3 
Mean  0.5  -0.3  0.2  0.3  -0.2 
Standard  deviation  0.2  0.6  0.2  0.4  0.4 
1990-91, less mean others  0.0  0.4  0.6  0.9  0.3 
State and local  1957:3-1958:2  0.2  0.3  0.1  0.0  0.4 
purchases  1960:2-1961:1  -0.1  0.4  -0.2  -0.2  0.5 
1969:4-1970:4  -0.3  0.1  -0.1  -0.3  0.1 
1973:4-1975:1  -0.1  -0.1  -0.3  -0.6  -0.1 
1980:1-1982:4  0.0  -0.8  0.0  0.0  -0.3 
1990:3-1991:1  0.1  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  -0.1 
Mean (excluding 1990-91)  -0.1  0.0  -0.1  -0.2  0.1 
Mean  0.0  0.0  -0.1  -0.2  0.1 
Standard  deviation  0.2  0.4  0.1  0.2  0.3 
1990-91, less mean others  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  -0.2 
Federal  1957:3-1958:2  0.3  -0.7  -0.9  -  1.8  -0.9 
purchases  1960:2-1961:1  -  1.1  0.0  0.6  0.2  0.0 
1969:4-1970:4  -  1.0  -  1.5  -  1.0  -  1.5  -  1.5 
1973:4-1975:1  -0.9  -0.2  -0.4  -0.5  -0.2 
1980:1-1982:4  0.0  0.4  0.0  0.0  0.1 
1990:3-1991:1  -0.2  0.2  -0.6  -0.6  0.4 
Mean (excluding 1990-91)  -0.5  -0.4  -0.3  -0.7  - 0.5 
Mean  -0.5  -0.3  -0.4  -0.7  -0.3 
Standard  deviation  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.7 
1990-91, less mean others  0.3  0.6  -0.3  0.1  0.9 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on CBO  estimates  and NIPA. 154  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
and were still falling relative to trend in the recovery quarters.  In the 
most recent recession, the widely advertised  overbuilding  of commer- 
cial and  office structures  showed  up as only a modest  departure  from  the 
average  performance  of this sector in the quarters  leading  up to the re- 
cession and  as no departure  from  average  during  the recession  itself. But 
during  the recovery, nonresidential  construction  has declined  relative  to 
trend  by 0.6 percent  of GDP, compared  with no change  in the previous 
five recessions. 
EXPORTS  AND  IMPORTS.  Foreign  trade  has, on balance, been coun- 
tercyclical  around  recessions. Imports,  shown with sign reversed  in ta- 
ble 2 so as to represent  their contribution  to GDP, fell relative  to trend 
during  recession, rose during  recovery, and  changed  little  in the year  be- 
fore the peak. Exports rose relative to trend except during  recession, 
where the mean performance  was dominated  by sharp  declines in the 
recessions starting  in 1957  and 1980,  when there were coincident  reces- 
sions in the rest of the industrial  world. Surprisingly,  exports  did not de- 
cline in the 1973-75 recession, which also had counterparts  abroad. 
Taken together, exports and imports  have supported  final sales before 
and during  recessions, and retarded  the recovery phase of the cycles. 
The recent recession has followed this typical  pattern. 
GOVERNMENT  PURCHASES.  The only  important contribution of 
government  purchases  to the recession episodes has been the fairly  per- 
sistent tendency of federal  purchases  to decline relative  to trend. How- 
ever, there is considerable  variation  across the different  recessions and 
the mean  is never as large  as the standard  error  for either  state and  local 
purchases  or federal  purchases.  The absence of any countercyclical  be- 
havior  of federal  purchases  presumably  reflects the sporadic  impact  of 
changes  in defense budgets, and the long delays in using  purchases  as a 
response to recessions, as well as the use of increased  transfers-and, 
occasionally,  tax changes-instead. 
INFERENCES  FROM  COMPONENTS.  The systematic importance  of 
residential  construction  in the weakness of final  sales before  and during 
recessions almost surely reflects the importance  of monetary  policy in 
causing  recessions. This sector  accounts  for only about  4 percent  of final 
sales, yet accounts  for more  than  one-half  the weakness in final  sales in 
the quarters  leading to recession. The great importance  of consumer 
spending-which  is less  striking because consumption is  seventeen 
times as large a sector as homebuilding-could come from shocks or George  L. Perry  and Charles  L. Schultze  155 
Figure 2.  Federal Funds Rate, Real Federal Funds Rate, and High-Employment Surplus 
Ratio, 1955-92a 
Percent 
20  ii  ii 
l  l  l  l  lII 
15  I  I  Nominal 
II  I:  ::  Z  A  :  /:  \:  A  federalfunds:I 
10  H  High-employment  s 
ssurplus  iratio 
(I'  ,-V  Real  fre  ral I  fed  funds  rt 
1955  1960  1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  various  issues; NIPA;  and  CBO  estimates. 
a. The vertical  lines are NBER-dated  business  cycle peaks and troughs.  The high-employment  surplus  ratio is 
shown  as a four-quarter  moving  average  and  is expressed  as a percent  of potential  GDP.  The real  federal  funds  rate 
is calculated  by subtracting  the inflation  rate  in the GDP  deflator  over  the four  most  recent  quarters  from  the nominal 
fed funds  rate. 
from policy, but its importance  also shows that consumer spending 
around recessions is much more responsive to current  developments 
than  many  theories  would  predict.  The systematic  weakness  of business 
investment  during  recessions also shows a high  responsiveness  of busi- 
ness decisions to current  developments. 
Policy  around Recessions 
Some measures  of policy variations  since 1955  are shown in figure  2. 
Fiscal policy is summarized  by the high employment  surplus, as mea- 
sured by the Congressional  Budget Office, expressed as a percent of 
potential GDP. A four-quarter  moving average is used to smooth out 
abrupt  changes  in the CBO  quarterly  data.  Monetary  policy is character- 
ized by the federal  funds  rate, which  is shown  both  as a nominal  rate  and 
as a real  rate  derived  by subtracting  the inflation  rate  in the GDP  deflator 
over the most recent  four  quarters.  We believe the funds  rate  represents 
a useful  characterization  of Federal  Reserve policy and  is a variable  that 
the Fed can control  and set where it wants. 
We do not look at various measures of the money supply as a way 
to characterize  policy because of the notorious  instability  of alternative 
money measures  in relation  to other economic variables.  This instabil- 
ity, in turn,  has kept  the Federal  Reserve  from  using  money  measures  as 156  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
a policy instrument  during  most of the period. The instability  is illus- 
trated  in appendix  table  Al, where  we present  the percent  changes  in M2 
velocity over five recession subperiods.  The standard  errors  in velocity 
across recessions are typically more than half as large as the standard 
errors  of GDP itself. Interest  rates cannot account for this irregularity 
because interest  rate  variations  across recessions are at least somewhat 
similar. 
One period  poses some problems  for our characterization  of policy. 
At the end of 1979  and  into the early 1980s,  Fed policy was related  more 
closely to monetary  aggregates  so that  the behavior  of the federal  funds 
rate was more volatile than it would have been under  operating  proce- 
dures that targeted  the funds rate directly. But in general, we interpret 
movements  in the funds  rate  as movements  that  the Fed chose to make. 
Monetary  policy has tightened,  usually sharply,  in the quarters  lead- 
ing up to peaks before every recession except the last one. In this last 
episode, the funds  rate  was raised  by a full three  percentage  points dur- 
ing 1988  and the first  half of 1989,  but it was then gradually  reduced  by 
1.5 points up to the cyclical peak. The picture  of monetary  policy is no 
different in terms of real, rather  than nominal, interest rates. This is 
readily  apparent  in figure  2 and  is equally  true  if real  rates  are calculated 
using  inflation  over the past  eight  quarters  or even twelve quarters.  Over 
intervals  relevant  for recession analysis,  movements  in nominal  and  real 
interest  rates have been dominated  by the variations  in nominal  rates. 
Over  longer  periods  of time, where the gap between real  and nominal 
rates has varied, real rates are the more informative  variable  for most 
purposes. In particular,  the effect on real  interest  rates of persistent  dif- 
ferences in the high employment  surplus  is apparent  from the relation 
between  the two near  the peaks  preceding  the six recessions. The corre- 
lation between the real rate and the surplus  in the four quarters  before 
peaks  is - 0.75 across the six recessions. A regression  of these observa- 
tions shows that  a 1  percent  higher  surplus  ratio  predicts  a 1  point lower 
real  federal  funds  rate  in the long run. 
The high  employment  surplus  ratio  varies  less systematically  in rela- 
tion to recessions than the funds rate. Although  it has often been dis- 
cussed as a countercyclical  tool, its behavior  is importantly  influenced 
by other  events and  priorities.  Major  variations  in the surplus  ratio  have 
been associated with wars and their aftermaths.  Even when economic 
stabilization  is considered in budget-making,  the process of debating George  L. Perry  and Charles  L. Schultze  157 
and legislating  changes and, subsequently,  of implementing  them may 
move the timing  of fiscal changes away from their  countercyclical  pur- 
pose. As table 2 showed, federal purchases  have declined on average 
relative  to GDP  before, during,  and  after  recessions. Nonetheless, some 
countercyclical  behavior  appears  in the surplus  ratio  around  recessions 
in figure  1. The decline in the surplus  ratio between the early and mid- 
1980s  is also apparent. 
Regressions Explaining Recessions 
The preceding  discussion  has characterized  recessions by the perfor- 
mance of the overall economy and individual  sectors relative to trend. 
We now turn  to how recessions  look against  predicted  values  from  equa- 
tions. Our choice of specification  and technique is a compromise  be- 
tween imposing  a minimum  of priors, as is done in vector autoregres- 
sions, and looking hard  for the variables  and specifications  that would 
maximize  the explained  variance.  Throughout,  we explain  the change  in 
the logs of variables  using  as few lagged  values  of the dependent  variable 
and the minimum  number  of other explanatory  variables  as seem to be 
relevant. 
Policy  Regressions 
First  we look at regressions,  shown  in table  3, that  explain  the change 
in the log of GDP using only the lagged  dependent  variable  and lags on 
the two policy variables:  the change  in the high  employment  surplus  ra- 
tio and the change in the federal  funds rate. Estimates are shown both 
for the full sample  and  for a subsample,  which  we discuss below, limited 
to quarters  preceding,  during,  and  following  recessions. The most obvi- 
ous source of bias in equations  of this form  would be from  the reaction 
of policymakers  to GDP changes;  because these should  have the oppo- 
site sign, the bias from this source should, if anything,  move our esti- 
mates  toward  zero. For example,  as GDP  declines, for  whatever  reason, 
monetary  policy can be expected to lower interest rates, leading to a 
positive  correlation  over some interval.  Estimating  with  lags on the pol- 
icy variables  minimizes  this problem. 
We first  experimented  with the number  of lags to include.  The fit im- 
proved  noticeably  when the number  was increased  from three to eight 158  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Table  3. Explaining  Real Output  Relative  to Trend  with Policy  Variables,  1956-92a 
Independent variables  Summary 
statistic 
High 
Lagged  employment  Federal  _  Durbin- 
Equation  Sample  Constant  dependent  surpliusb  fiunds rateb  R2  Watson 
3-1  Full sample  -0.0002  0.379(4)  -0.655(8)  -0.680(6)  0.235  2.00 
(-0.273)  (3.777)  (-2.644)  (-5.758) 
3-2  Recessions only  -0.0010  0.317(4)  -1.104(8)  -0.668(6)  0.243  2.06 
(-0.273)  (2.442)  (-1.974)  (-4.325) 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based  on NIPA;  Federal  Reserve  Bulletin,  various  issues;  and CBO  estimates. 
a. The dependent  variable  is the change  in the log of real  GDP  minus  the change  in the log of potential  GDP.  The 
coefficient  shown is the sum of the coefficients  on the lagged  values;  the number  of lagged  values is given in the 
parentheses  after  the coefficient.  The t-statistic  below each coefficient  is for the sum  of the lagged  coefficients. 
b. The high-employment  surplus  ratio  and federal  funds  rate  are expressed  as first  differences. 
on all variables,  and  even up to twelve quarters  on the surplus  ratio. But 
the individual  coefficient  estimates  on successive lags varied  erratically 
and the long-run  effects of the federal  funds rate, calculated  by solving 
for the steady-state  change, seemed unrealistically  large. We recognize 
that, with several lagged variables,  the coefficients may not be easy to 
interpret.  But we also feared  that,  given so much  freedom  to choose, the 
regression  would "cherry-pick"  from a few stray observations  and do 
better  than  it should.  Also, when the real  funds  rate, defined  as in figure 
2, replaced  the nominal  funds rate, the fit deteriorated  markedly.  And 
when inflation  was added, in various  forms, along with the funds rate, 
its coefficient  was erratic  and  generally  insignificant. 
For all these reasons, we chose to focus on equations,  shown  in table 
3, that  allow  four  lags on the lagged  dependent,  six lags on the funds  rate, 
and  eight  lags on the surplus  ratio.  Estimates  are shown both  for the full 
sample  (3-1)  and  for a subsample  confined  to the quarters  around  reces- 
sions (3-2), which we discuss below. Here and throughout,  the number 
in parentheses  following  the coefficient  estimate  indicates  the numbers 
of quarters  of lagged values that are used; the coefficient shown is the 
sum of the coefficients  on those lagged  values, and the t-statistics  refer 
to the sum  of the lagged  coefficients.  The lagged  coefficients  in this spec- 
ification  did not vary erratically  and they conformed  roughly  to our pri- 
ors that fiscal policy works with the longest lags. Also, the long-run 
impacts of policy seemed reasonable in the full-sample  estimates of 
equation  3-1, with a 1 percent  rise in the surplus  ratio  or a one point rise 
in the funds  rate  each producing  a 1.1 percent  decline in GDP. George  L. Perry  and Charles  L. Schultze  159 
The possible reaction  of policy to nonpolicy shocks, apart  from the 
effects of these shocks on GDP, presents another  potential source of 
bias in the estimates, and bias from  this source could be in either  direc- 
tion. The clearest examples  are the two OPEC  oil price shocks, each of 
which preceded  a recession. Even with accommodating  policies, these 
shocks might  have depressed  real  GDP  by shifting  real  income  to oil pro- 
ducers in the United States and abroad  with low propensities  to spend 
on U.S. production.  If policy reacted  to these shocks by tightening,  pre- 
sumably  to head off an escalation of overall inflation  that might  follow 
from sharply  higher  oil prices, policy also would depress real GDP. In 
such a case, our regressions  will credit  both effects to the policy change 
that is correlated  with the outside shock. The opposite correlation  and 
bias would arise if shocks that would themselves boost GDP are corre- 
lated  with tightening  policy. 
Because we cannot  hope to model  the contribution  of all such nonpol- 
icy shocks, we interpret  the policy regressions  of table 3 as providing 
estimates  of the contribution  of policy changes  to the cycle. By examin- 
ing the residuals,  we can help gauge how much  of the cycle is left to be 
explained  by nonpolicy shocks and endogenous  dynamics  that are not 
captured  in the lagged  dependent  variable.  The strength  and  significance 
of both the fiscal and monetary  policy variables  is a robust  finding  in the 
regressions  of table  3, as well as in the regressions  not reported  that  used 
different  lags on the same explanatory  variable. 
Equation 3-2 is estimated over just the periods between P -4  and 
T + 4 around  each recession. This recession sample contains 84 of the 
146  total observations  in our data  period.  The same regression  fit to the 
remaining  sixty-two observations  produced  nonsensical results with a 
negative  adjusted  R2.  If we were to offer a model to motivate  our focus 
on the recession subsample,  it would be based on endogenous  changes 
in expectations  during  and  around  recessions. But rather  than  elaborate 
on such a model, we simply  note that  the datajustify  using  the recession 
subsample. 
Predicting Recessions  and Recoveries 
We next examine how well this policy equation  explains recessions 
by looking  at its predictions  and  errors.  These results  are summarized  in 
table  4 where, for the intervals  from P - 4 to T and from  T to T + 5, we 160  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
Table  4. Variations  in GDP  Due to Policy  Variables  and to Other  Factors 
Change  as percent  of potential  GDP 
Interval 
Sample and statistic  (P-4)  to T  T to (T+5) 
Mean  recession excluding  1990-91 
Actual  -7.0  3.2 
Due to policy  -6.5  2.5 
Due to other  -0.5  0.7 
1990-91  recession 
Actual  -4.2  -0.6 
Due to policy  -1.4  1.8 
Due to other  -2.8  -2.4 
1990-91  less mean excluding  1990-91 
Actual  2.7  - 3.8 
Due to policy  5.1  -0.7 
Due to other  -2.4  - 3.1 
Source: Based  on authors'  calculations.  Actual  values  are  from  table 1. "Due  to policy"  is the dynamic  prediction, 
starting  at P-4,  and again  at T, from  the "recessions  only" regression,  equation  3-2 in table  3 (change  over each 
interval  in the sum  of Alog  predictions).  "Due to other"  is the difference  between  actual  and "due  to policy." 
show three statistics. "Actual"  is the change shown in table 1, "due  to 
policy" is the change predicted  by equation  3-2 in table 3, and "due to 
other"  is the difference, the prediction  error  that we attribute  to other 
shocks or to the inability  of the policy equation  to accurately  model the 
dynamics  of recessions. As in previous tables, the units are change in 
GDP  relative  to trend  as a percent  of potential  GDP. Because the entries 
are  the sums  of changes  in logs, they represent  the error  in the prediction 
of the levels of the variables  starting  from  the initial  level at P-  4 for the 
first  column  of data,  and  starting  from  the initial  level at T for the second 
column  of data. 
For recessions before the last one, policy changes, on average, ac- 
count  for a large  fraction  of the actual  change  in GDP  both up to and  fol- 
lowing  the recession troughs.  On average,  downturns  are worse and re- 
coveries  are  stronger than the  equation predicts, but  the  mean 
prediction  error  is well under 1 percent  of GDP at the end of both inter- 
vals. In the recent recession, in contrast,  actual  GDP is 2.8 percent  be- 
low prediction  at the trough.  And in the five subsequent  quarters  of re- 
covery, GDP falls an additional  2.4 percent below prediction. Thus 
when the contributions  of policy changes are taken into account, the George  L. Perry  and Charles  L. Schultze  161 
economy during  the recent recession and recovery was exceptionally 
weak  not only during  the early  recovery  phase, as the actual  data  of table 
1 reveal, but over the previous  seven quarters,  as well. 
Regressions  for  Individual Sectors 
To look further  at the behavior  of GDP  during  recessions, and  during 
the latest recession in particular,  we turn  to regressions  for major  com- 
ponents of final sales, taking  a pragmatic  view of how to specify those 
equations.  We do not try to get the best possible fit, as a short-term  fore- 
casting  exercise might  achieve by using  preflow  data, such as orders  for 
durable  goods, permits  for new housing,  or consumer  sentiment.  Nor do 
we limit ourselves to a highly restricted set of explanatory  variables, 
such as the policy set described  above. Rather  we use what  we regard  as 
a parsimonious  specification  for each sector, but one that makes use of 
our priors  about  what is important  in determining  short-run  behavior  of 
individual  sectors. Monetary  policy, in the form of the federal funds 
rate, appears  explicitly in some equations. Fiscal policy, measured  by 
the high employment  surplus,  is included  indirectly  because we use in- 
come after  taxes and  transfers  as explanatory  variables  for some private 
sectors. 
Table 5 summarizes  the equations  estimated, as before, over the re- 
cession subsample,  but this time  for several  sectors: consumption  and a 
breakdown  into durables, nondurables,  and services; residential  con- 
struction; producers' durable equipment (PDE); nonresidential  con- 
struction;  state and  local government  spending;  and  imports.  We found 
no useful equation for estimating  exports or federal purchases in the 
context of our recession analysis. Some of the equations  in table 5 were 
fit using  polynomial  distributed  lags, with the number  of lags chosen af- 
ter looking  first  at equations  with the same variables,  but with four lags 
on each. 
We are interested  in the equations  primarily  for what they fail to pre- 
dict in the quarters  around  recessions. We get at this in table 6, which 
shows the sum of static residuals  from the table 5 regressions, using a 
similar  format  and  expressed  in the same  units  as table  2. Looking  at the 
mean  for all  recessions, spending  is generally  overpredicted  in the prere- 
cession and recession quarters  and underpredicted  during  the early re- CO  'IC  N  00  00  00  0  ?  Q 
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Change as percent of potential GDP 
Interval 
(P-4) 
(P-4)  T to  P to T  to 
Component  Recession  to P  P  to T  (T+5)  (a.r.)  (T+5) 
Consumption  Mean  -0.1  -0.8  0.7  -  1.  1  -0.2 
1990-91  recession  -0.7  -1.4  0.0  -2.8  -2.1 
Mean  other  recessions  0.0  -0.7  0.8  -0.8  0.2 
Standard  deviation  (all)  0.5  0.6  0.4  0.9  ... 
1990-91,  less mean  others  -0.8  -0.7  -0.8  - 2.0  -2.3 
Durable  goods  Mean  -0.2  -0.2  0.3  -0.4  -0.1 
1990-91  recession  -0.8  -0.5  0.1  -0.9  -  1.1 
Mean  other  recessions  -0.1  -0.2  0.4  -0.3  0.1 
Standard  deviation  (all)  0.3  0.4  0.2  0.4  ... 
1990-91,  less mean  others  -0.7  -0.3  -0.2  -0.7  -1.2 
Nondurable  goods  Mean  0.1  -0.3  0.2  -0.4  0.0 
1990-91  recession  -0.1  -0.4  -0.1  -0.8  -0.6 
Mean  other  recessions  0.1  -0.3  0.2  -0.3  0.1 
Standard  deviation  (all)  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3 
1990-91,  less mean  others  -0.3  -0.1  -0.3  -0.5  -0.7 
Services  Mean  0.0  -0.3  0.2  -0.3  -0.1 
1990-91  recession  0.1  -0.6  -0.1  -  1.1  -0.5 
Mean  other  recessions  0.0  -0.2  0.2  -0.2  0.0 
Standard  deviatiGn  (all)  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.4  ... 
1990-91,  less mean others  0.1  -0.4  -0.3  -0.9  -0.5 
Residential  fixed  Mean  -0.1  -0.2  0.2  -0.2  - 0.1 
investment  1990-91  recession  -0.6  -0.4  0.0  -0.8  -  1.0 
Mean  other  recessions  0.0  -0.2  0.2  -0.1  0.0 
Standard  deviation  (all)  0.3  0.5  0.2  0.5  . 
1990-91,  less mean  others  -0.6  -0.2  -0.2  -0.7  -  1.0 
Producers'  Mean  0.0  -0.1  0.1  -0.3  0.0 
durable  equipment  1990-91  recession  -0.1  -0.2  0.4  -0.5  0.1 
Mean  other  recessions  0.1  -0.1  0.0  -0.2  0.0 
Standard  deviation  (all)  0.1  0.4  0.2  0.4  . 
1990-91,  less mean  others  -0.2  -0.2  0.4  -0.2  0.0 
Mock producers'  Mean  0.0  -0.1  0.1  --0.3  0.0 
durable  equipment  1990-91  recession  -0.2  -0.3  0.2  -0.6  -0.4 
Mean  other  recessions  0.1  0.0  0.0  -0.2  0.1 
Standard  deviation  (all)  0.1  0.5  0.2  0.4  . 
1990-91,  less mean  others  -0.3  -0.2  0.1  -0.4  -0.5 
Nonresidential  Mean  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0 
structures  1990-91  recession  0.0  -0.2  -0.1  - 0.4  -0.3 
Mean  other  recessions  0.0  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.1 
Standard  deviation  (all)  0.1  0.2  0.1  0.2  . 
1990-91,  less mean others  0.0  -0.3  0.0  -0.4  -0.3 
Imports  (sign  Mean  0.1  -0.1  - 0.1  --  0.1  - 0.1 
reversed)  1990-91  recession  -0.1  0.1  -1.0  0.2  -1.0 
Mean  other  recessions  0.2  -0.2  0.1  -0.1  0.1 
Standard  deviation  (all)  0.3  0.4  0.5  0.5  . 
1990-91,  less mean  others  -0.3  0.3  -  1.1  0.4  -  1.1 
State  and local  Mean  0.0  0.1  -0.1  0.1  0.0 
purchases  1990-91  recession  -0.1  -0.1  0.0  -0.1  -0.2 
Mean  other  recessions  0.0  0.1  -0.1  0.2  0.0 
Standard  deviation  (all)  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.2  . . 
1990-91,  less mean  others  -0.1  - 0.2  0.1  - 0.3  -0.2 
Source:  Table  5 equations.  These are the changes  in the sum  of the residuals  over the periods  shown. 164  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
covery quarters.  However, the mean  errors  for subperiods,  now shown 
to T + 5 for consistency, are not large  alongside  the changes  in table 2. 
For the most recent recession, the most striking  feature  revealed by 
the equation errors in table 6 is the pervasive weakness, revealed by 
overpredictions,  across all sectors (including  producers'  durable  equip- 
ment  when we look at the mock PDE version discussed below). Across 
the whole period  from  P - 4 to T + 5, all are  overpredicted  relative  to the 
mean of past recessions. And some are overpredicted  relative to past 
means  in each subperiod  as well. We turn  next to what  the data  for indi- 
vidual  sectors reveal about  the latest recession. 
CONSUMPTION.  Spending by consumers has not only been weak 
during  this recovery, as table 2 showed, but it has been substantially 
overpredicted  relative to earlier  recessions in the other subperiods  as 
well, and  especially so during  the recession itself when the decline  is ex- 
pressed  at annual  rates. The weakness  in total  consumption  is evident  in 
each of the subcategories  of the total, although  not always  with  the same 
timing.  The weakness in durable  goods spending  was especially marked 
in the year preceding  the recession and in the recession itself when ex- 
pressed at annual  rates. Even in the first year of recovery, the error  in 
durables  this time relative  to previous  recoveries  was an overprediction 
of 0.2 percent  of potential  GDP, which is an error  of about  5 percent  of 
durable  goods spending.  Spending  on services held up before  the reces- 
sion, but was overpredicted  thereafter.  Within  durable  goods, the over- 
predic-tions  were concentrated  in motor  vehicle purchases  (not shown). 
Weakness  in consumption  was also highlighted  in Olivier  J. Blanchard's 
analysis  of the recent recession, though  his VAR analysis  found it con- 
centrated  in nondurable  goods.4 We also assign more responsibility  to 
nonconsumption  sectors than  he does. 
RESIDENTIAL  CONSTRUCTION.  Table  2 showed a striking  regularity 
of weak residential  construction  spending  in the quarters  before all re- 
cessions. Table 6 reveals that in the recent recession, this sector has 
been overpredicted  across each subperiod.  Compared  to the mean of 
earlier  recessions, residential  construction  has underperformed  by 1.0 
percent  of GDP over the entire  period  from P - 4 to T + 5. This may re- 
flect  an exceptional  overhang  of multifamily  structures  and  some unwill- 
ingness to make  mortgages  in some parts  of the market. 
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PRODUCERS'  DURABLE  EQUIPMENT.  Comparing  the mean  errors  of 
table  6 with  actual  changes  from  table  2, spending  on producers'  durable 
equipment  appears  well predicted  by the equation.  But in the recent re- 
covery, the exceptional  rise in PDE spending  produced  by far  the largest 
error  for any period for any recession. It would appear  that whatever 
general  forces not captured  in the predicting  equations  depressed con- 
sumption  and residential  construction, they were not at work in this 
sector. 
However, the concentration  of investment  strength  in the high-tech 
sector  of PDE suggests  that  the special  problems  with  deflating  those ex- 
penditures  may  be distorting  the measure  of activity  in the sector. In par- 
ticular,  the part of the surprising  increase in PDE that comes from the 
rapidly  declining  deflator  that is used to take account of technical  prog- 
ress generates  no employment  and  is probably  not predictable  from  con- 
venitional  equipment  demand  models. So we investigated  how a PDE to- 
tal, obtained by substituting  the deflator  for the rest of PDE for the 
deflator  for high-tech  equipment,  performs  in this and  earlier  recessions. 
The results  are shown  in the row  for mock  PDE in table  6, based  on equa- 
tion 5-7, which has a somewhat  better fit over the entire sample  period 
than  does 5-6, the equation  for official  PDE. Compared  with  other  reces- 
sions, mock PDE is overpredicted  in the pre-recession  and recession 
quarters.  Although  it is still relatively strong  in this recovery, it is not 
the outlier that the official PDE measure  is, with a prediction  error  of 
only half  the standard  deviation  across all recoveries. 
OTHER  SECTORS.  The remainder  of business fixed investment- 
nonresidential  structures-has  been exceptionally weak in this reces- 
sion; however, because it accounts  for only 3 percent  of GDP, the over- 
predictions  do not account  for much  of the overall  weakness in GDP. It 
should  be noted that the contrast  between this performance  and that of 
PDE does not represent  contrary  behavior  by the same  businesses. The 
weakness in construction  is dominated  by the commercial  and office 
building  sectors, which have been depressed by overcapacity  and the 
unwillingness  of financial  institutions  to extend mortgage  financing  to 
the sector in most parts  of the country. 
There  is less to say about  the remaining  sectors. Imports  have alter- 
nating  positive and negative errors  in the subperiods;  rising  imports  in 
the most recent  recovery  have been an exceptional  drag  on GDP  relative 
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so. State  and  local government  spending  was also slightly  weaker  in this 
recession relative to others, but again we have no conjectures about 
why. As noted  earlier,  we offer no equations  to explain  exports  and  fed- 
eral  purchases  during  recessions. 
Policy  Reactions 
The finding  that  policy accounts  for a good part  of the economy's per- 
formance  around  recessions leads naturally  to looking  for a way to eval- 
uate the conduct of policy and in particular  to judge its performance  in 
the latest recession and recovery. Although the equations of table 3 
showed that both fiscal and monetary  policy were important  determi- 
nants  of GDP  around  recessions, we focus on monetary  policy because, 
as we discussed  earlier,  fiscal  policy has not been conducted  in a system- 
atic way relative to the business cycle. Even for monetary  policy, it is 
difficult  to pose the question  of how well the Fed has conducted  policy 
around  recessions. The Fed has no policy rule  with which  to control  the 
growth  of, say, nominal  GDP  with much  precision,  let alone  to eliminate 
both recessions and inflation.  Thus in setting  policy, the Fed must deal 
with the economic conditions  that exist-which,  up to now, has meant 
reacting  countercyclically  to both inflation  and unemployment  and, at 
times, to clearly  evident shocks that  have implications  for the economy. 
Although  we find  this description  of the conduct of monetary  policy 
realistic,  it does not lead  to a reaction  function  that  adequately  describes 
the Federal  Reserve's behavior  over time. There are a number  of rea- 
sons for this. One is that  Fed policy cannot  be modeled  properly  in rela- 
tion to the aforementioned  special shocks. Perhaps  more important  is 
the changing  importance  over time that policymakers  have attached  to 
inflation  and unemployment.  When  we estimated  reaction  functions, fit 
either  to our entire sample  or to only the recession subsample,  changes 
in the unemployment  rate and changes in inflation  both had significant 
coefficients  with the expected sign in explaining  changes in the federal 
funds rate. Other variables meant to capture the interaction  between 
levels and changes in inflation  were, to our surprise,  insignificant.  All 
these equations,  on average,  substantially  underpredicted  the rise in the 
funds  rate  in the quarters  leading  up  to cyclical peaks  and  overpredicted, 
although  by a lesser amount,  the increase  in the  funds  rate  in the quarters 
following troughs. We conclude that, although  monetary  policy is po- 
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reaction  functions do not characterize  the policy process well. Even if 
they did, they would not provide  evidence of whether  monetary  policy 
had  done its  job well or badly. 
The recent recession stands out for the high level of real Fed funds 
with which it started.  At P - 4, the real  funds rate  calculated  using  four- 
quarter  lagged  inflation  in the GDP deflator  was 4.8 percent, compared 
with a mean of 0.3 percent in previous recessions. This is high, even 
allowing  for the long-term  decline in the surplus  ratio and the rule of 
thumb  suggested  by equation  3-1 of table  3, in which a 1  percent  decline 
in the surplus  ratio  would be offset by about  a one point increase in the 
real funds rate. Comparing  the economy across the P - 4 quarters  pre- 
ceding  all recessions, the real  funds rate before the latest recession was 
4.5 points above the mean  and the surplus  ratio  was only 1.9 points be- 
low the mean. Starting  from this high level of the funds rate preceding 
the last recession, monetary  policy was prompt  in easing. Nonetheless, 
at T + 5, the real funds rate, at 1.2 percent, was still higher  than in any 
previous recovery except the one following the 1982  trough, a period 
when inflation  dropped  precipitously. 
Most observers believe the latest recovery has been unnecessarily 
slow. To blame the Fed for this presumes it should have been able to 
forecast that  outcome, which may  be asking  too much, or at least that it 
should have been able to react more promptly  and aggressively  to the 
evidence as it emerged.  Many  observers  reasoned  that, point estimates 
aside, the risk was overwhelmingly  in doing too little to encourage  re- 
covery, especially  in light  of the scheduled  reduction  of defense outlays, 
the widely  recognized  depression  in construction,  the weakness  in other 
industrial  sectors, and a number  of other special problems  of both the 
financial  and nonfinancial  sectors of the economy-some  of which we 
examine  more closely below. As William  C. Brainard  pointed out long 
ago, in a world  of uncertainty,  how vigorously  policy should  be pursued 
will depend  on how far  from  the desired  level the actual  economy  is.5 At 
the start  of a recovery, GDP  is very far  from  where it should  be. 
Employment and Consumption 
One of the features  of the current  recovery that has repeatedly  been 
characterized  as different  is the lack of employment  growth.  In this con- 
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nection,  the widely  publicized  structural  reductions  in the workforces  of 
numerous  U.S. corporations  are  taken  as evidence  that  corporate  down- 
sizing  has produced  a recovery  with  uniquely  depressed  hiring  and small 
employment  gains. In view of the large  role of weak consumer  spending 
in  this  recession  episode,  documented above,  weak  employment 
growth,  in turn,  may have contributed  exceptionally  to the weakness of 
aggregate  demand.  Two questions  are at issue. Has employment  grown 
more  slowly than  expected given the cyclical behavior  of the economy? 
And  to the extent that  employment  has grown  more  slowly than  in previ- 
ous recoveries, whether  for special reasons or because the expansion 
was weak, has this behavior  in turn  affected  the growth  of aggregate  de- 
mand  in a distinctive  way? 
PRODUCTIVITY.  One part  of this issue has to do with productivity, 
as shown in figure  3. The first  panel of the figure  confirms  that, in com- 
parison  with other  recoveries, employment  growth  in the nonfarm  busi- 
ness sector  has been stagnant  over the past several  years. But  as the sec- 
ond panel of the figure  makes clear, output  has also grown much more 
slowly in this recovery. Is the disappointing  employment  growth  simply 
the consequence  of sluggish  output  growth,  or does it also reflect  an un- 
expected improvement  in productivity, perhaps related to the recent 
and well-publicized  downsizing  and restructuring  efforts among many 
U.S. firins? 
Productivity  growth over the four quarters  of 1992, at 3.2 percent, 
represented  a substantial  pickup from the very low pace of 1990 and 
1991,  and  exceeded by a noticeable  margin  the 0.85 percent  a year trend 
growth  that has characterized  the period since 1973. But productivity 
has a cyclical component. It typically does poorly relative to trend in 
recession  and  picks up in recovery. Changing  labor  inputs  for a firm  is a 
costly process, the extent of the costs depending  on a number  of factors, 
including  the speed of the change. Labor  is not shed proportionately  to 
output  during  cyclical contractions  and  the subsequent  recovery  begins 
in an environment  of "surplus"  labor  on business payrolls.  Some output 
growth  can be accomplished  with  little  or no addition  of aggregate  hours 
of labor  input. But eventually the slack in the workforce  will be elimi- 
nated, and further  output increases will require  additions  to aggregate 
hours  of labor  input.6  These may  come from  expanded  employment.  Or, 
6. At a microeconomic  level, this is a clearly  nonlinear  process. But because across 
the economy  individual  firms  start  with widely differing  degrees of slack and reach the 
"tipping"  point  at different  times, the aggregate  numbers  are  much  smoother. George L. Perry and Charles L. Schultze  169 
Figure 3.  Employment and Output, before and after the Trough of Recession 
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because of hiring  costs, firms  that are uncertain  about the permanence 
of improvements  in their  markets  may  initially  meet additional  labor  re- 
quirements  by increasing  the length of the workweek;  only as they be- 
come less uncertain  may  they substitute  new employees  for higher  aver- 
age hours. Finally, business firms  may consistently overpredict  future 
markets  in the latter stages of business cycle expansions, as Robert  J. 
Gordon  has proposed.7  Firms  foresee a continuation  of recovery rates 
of growth, and in response increase labor  inputs excessively. A subse- 
quent  correction  occurs when the recession dashes their optimistic  ex- 
pectations,  and the consequent  rebound  of productivity  is independent 
7. See Gordon  (1984)  and  his paper  in this issue of BPEA. 170  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1993 
Table 7.  Productivity and GDP Growth during Recoveries 
Number  of  Change  in GDP 
quarters  Productivity  gap  from 
Productivity  before  chanige  T to T+N 
deviation  productivity  minuils  trend 
Recessioni  from trend  exceeded  growth  GDP gaip  at  Ainnual 
trough  (T)  at trouigh  trend  (N)a  (a.r.)  trough  Actual  rate 
1961:1  -2.5  9  1.2  -3.6  2.9  1.3 
1970:4  -1.3  6  1.3  -1.6  2.6  1.7 
1975:1  -2.6  2  7.0  -6.1  1.4  2.8 
1982:4  - 1.9  6  1.5  -  8.9  6.3  4.2 
1991:1  -2.1  6  1.6  -4.0  -0.1  0.0 
Source: BLS, Produictivity  atnd  Costs, various  issues (nonfarm  business  sector)  and NIPA. 
a. Time  trend  of quarterly  log of productivity  with  trend  breaks  in 1967  and 1974  is fit to 1955-89  and  extrapolated 
through  1992. 
of a rebound  in output.  To the extent that such overhiring  and  its subse- 
quent correction  take place, a separate  cyclical component  is added  to 
short-run  productivity  changes. 
Table 7 examines  the productivity  record  (nonfarm  business, output 
per hour) during  recent recoveries. At first glance, the first three col- 
umns  of data  would seem to confirm  the conclusion  that there has been 
nothing surprising  about productivity  behavior in this recovery. Six 
quarters  after the cycle trough  in 1992:3,  productivity  began to exceed 
the trend  that  existed prior  to the onset of recession.8  In two of the prior 
four  recessions, productivity  also took six quarters  to exceed this trend. 
Moreover, the annual  excess of the actual  growth  in productivity  rela- 
tive to trend  in the current  recovery  was similar  to those two prior  recov- 
eries. So far, there is nothing  unusual  here. But the last two columns  of 
data  in the table  reveal  the striking  fact that  productivity  rebounded  past 
trend despite very modest increases  in output. In a model that explains 
cyclical productivity  movements as essentially deriving from adjust- 
ment  costs and  lags in hiring  and  firing,  the extent to which  productivity 
rises and falls relative to trend will depend on the pattern  of output  in- 
creases and decreases. In such a model, the improvement  of productiv- 
ity in this recovery may indeed have contained  some noncyclical "sur- 
prise" component. On the other hand, to the extent that much of the 
cyclical rebound  in productivity  simply represents  a correction  of the 
end-of-expansion  overhiring,  as Gordon  suggests, and is not associated 
8. A trend  was fitted  to the log of productivity  for the period  1955  to 1989,  with linear 
splines  in 1967  and 1974.  That  trend  was extrapolated  through  1992. George L. Perry and Charles L. Schultze  171 
with hiring lags and adjustment  costs,  the fact that productivity re- 
bounded in 1992 without significant  output gains may reflect nothing 
more  than  typical  cyclical behavior. 
We have tried but failed to reach a satisfactory conclusion about 
whether a productivity  surprise  has occurred. Robert Gordon, in his 
paper  in this volume, concludes there has been no surprise,  and that is 
probably  the best verdict  that  can be reached  with  current  evidence. But 
the weak employment  gains documented  in figure  3 may be significant 
for understanding  the weakness of the recovery in output, even if the 
sluggish  employment  does not arise  from  a productivity  surprise. 
THRESHOLD  EFFECTS  IN  EMPLOYMENT.  To the extent that the en- 
dogenous  response of aggregate  demand  to changes  in aggregate  output 
and  income is reduced  when output  growth  is accompanied  by little em- 
ployment growth, there may be a threshold  phenomenon  at work de- 
pressing consumption.  That is, some of the self-feeding  and self-rein- 
forcing  aspects of an economic recovery may come into effect only as 
the recovery  begins  to exceed some minimum  rate  of growth.  A produc- 
tivity surprise  would contribute  to such an effect by holding  down em- 
ployment  relative  to output,  but it is not a necessary  part  of the story. 
There are reasons to believe that the actual and perceived degree of 
employment  growth  does indeed  influence  consumer  demand  in a posi- 
tive way. During  the current  recovery, major  surveys of consumer  atti- 
tudes showed disappointing  and erratic recovery in pessimistic con- 
sumer evaluations  of the immediate  and expected economic situation. 
In particular,  and  in contrast  to other  recoveries, consumer  perceptions 
that  unemployment  was likely  to increase  did  not begin  to fall  in the early 
stages of  recovery. And in fact,  unemployment continued to  rise 
through  the middle  of 1992.  Carroll  recently  presented  a "buffer-stock" 
theory  of precautionary  saving, in which consumer  perceptions  that  un- 
employment  is likely to increase, along with the existence of high cur- 
rent unemployment,  tend to raise consumer saving; his evidence sug- 
gested that the sluggishness of  consumption spending through the 
middle  of 1992  can be partially  traced  to such effects.9  This is evidence 
that  the absence of self-fulfilling  employment  expectations  from  the cur- 
rent recovery, even if they did not come from a productivity  surprise, 
might  help explain  the weakness of consumption  this time. 
SPECIAL  EMPLOYMENT  EFFECTS.  In addition to possible  threshold 
9. Carroll  (1992). 172  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
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effects from employment  growth, other distinctive features of the job 
market  may help explain  weak consumption  growth  in recent years. In- 
deed, the fact that  table  6 showed  consumption  was weak relative  to pre- 
dictions  throughout  the latest recession episode, and  not only during  re- 
covery, suggests the need to look for other causes. Exceptionally  high 
levels of permanent  job loss during  the recent recession and its after- 
math, associated at least in part  with  job restructuring  by many  promi- 
nent firms, are one candidate  for explaining  the unusual  weakness in 
consumption  over this whole period.  '0 Recessions typically  cause a rise 
in both temporary  layoffs and permanent  job terminations.  The contri- 
bution of each to the aggregate  unemployment  rate is not parallel  be- 
cause the average  duration  of spells from temporary  layoffs is shorter. 
But past recessions reveal a characteristic  pattern of unemployment 
from  these two sources, as seen in figure  4, which plots the ratio of un- 
employed  workers  on layoff to those with  permanent  job loss. The ratio 
was about  normal  during  the expansion  of the 1980s.  But in the 1990-91 
recession, the ratio  never approached  the peaks of previous  recessions. 
And it has sunk  to new lows during  the recovery. Equation  1, predicting 
the change in the log of permanent  job losers, UP, from current  and 
lagged  values of the change  in the log of those laid off temporarily,  UT, 
underpredicts  permanent  job loss by 30 percent  by the end of 1992. 
10. James  Medoff  (1992)  first  called  attention  to permanent  job loss in recent  years in 
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(1)  AlnUP =  0.003  +  0.07  zlnUP(-  1) +  0.77  AlnUT(L) 
(0.65)  (11.57) 
R2  =  0.75;  Durbin-Watson  =  1.97;  period:  1968:2-1989:4; 
(t-statistics  in parentheses). 
Data  on permanent  job loss are available  only from 1967,  so they can- 
not be used in equations  like those in table 5. But in equation  2, which 
has the same form  as equation  5-1 but is fit to 1967:3-1989:4,  the rate of 
permanent  job loss explains  consumption  better  than  does the aggregate 
unemployment  rate, U. 
(2)  AInCONS  = 0.007  +  0.20  AInDPI(L)  -  0.40  zAFEDF(L) 
(1.51)  (-5.41) 
+  0.001 zAU(- 1)  -  1.34 zAUP(- 1)  -0.001  D80 
(0.22)  (-  1.51)  (-  1.26) 
R2  =  0.25;  Durbin-Watson  =  2.10;  period:  1967:3-1989:4; 
(t-statistics  in parentheses). 
The importance  of permanent,  as opposed to temporary,  job loss in 
affecting  consumer  attitudes  and  spending  is easy to understand.  If there 
is a distinctive  role of expectations  of job loss during  recessions that af- 
fects consumption  over and above the effect of actual  income loss, per- 
manent  job losses should  have a disproportionate  influence  on those ex- 
pectations. Furthermore,  the failure of the economy to produce new 
jobs would be especially damaging  alongside  the high  rate  of permanent 
losses. 
Financial Institutions and Financial Structure 
The exceptional underprediction  of activity in some sectors during 
the recent downturn  and recovery may also be related  to special prob- 
lems in the nation's  credit  markets  that  have been cited by many  econo- 
mists, financial  analysts, and economic policymakers.  Three main as- 
pects of the credit markets  have been identified  as suspects. First is a 
capital  shortage  in the nation's  banks, which shrank  the supply  of busi- 
ness loans. Second is a deterioration  in the balance sheets of business 
firms  following the debt explosion of the 1980s;  this subsequently in- 
creased  the price  and  nonprice  cost of credit  to would-be  borrowers  and 
made  them more  reluctant  to borrow  even at the same cost. Third  is the 174  Brookings  Papers on Economic  Activity,  1:1993 
excessively loose extension of credit for office buildings, commercial 
real  estate, and  related  activities  in the 1980s.  This  led to an overbuilding 
of commercial  structures  and  left a legacy of collapsed  real  estate values 
and loan write-offs, which in turn contributed  to write-downs in the 
value of bank (and other lenders') capital that helped bring  on capital 
shortage  problem  mentioned  above. 
An extensive popular  and academic  literature  has arisen  about these 
problems.  We cannot  break  major  new ground  in this paper,  but will try 
to summarize  results to date and discuss a few empirical  findings  that 
shed a little additional  light  on the subject. 
A Methodological  Problem 
Comparing  credit  flows from  various  sources to various  users across 
business cycles must be one component of any analysis of the role of 
financial  flows in the recent  recession. In comparing  data  on credit  flows 
in different  business cycles, the question immediately  arises of how to 
handle the widely differing  rates of inflation  from cycle to cycle. In a 
period  of rapidly  rising  prices, firms  need substantial  additions  of nomi- 
nal  working  capital  merely  to maintain  a steady  level of activity. At first, 
it would seem reasonable to measure the change in the real value of 
credit outstanding  by taking  the difference  between the deflated  values 
of outstanding  credit  at the beginning  and the end of the period. But as 
Ben S. Bernanke  and Cara  S. Lown point out, the effect of inflation  on 
business credit demands  and flows is quite complex."I  The effect de- 
pends upon the relationship  between the level of debt outstanding  and 
the nature  of the activity  being  financed.  For example,  because invento- 
ries turn  over very quickly, a $1,000 line of credit to finance  them will 
have to be doubled  if the price level doubles, even if no new activity is 
being  financed.  But if the value of outstanding  debt is very high  relative 
to the volume  of activity  to be financed  in a given period, this will not be 
true. Thus, if the annual  volume of gross fixed investment  is, say, 5 or 6 
percent  of the stock-which  itself had  been financed  by an accumulation 
of credits in the past-a  doubling  of the price level will require, in the 
short  run,  only a very modest  addition  to the nominal  stock of outstand- 
ing debt in order to finance the existing real level of fixed investment 
outlays. 
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At one end of the spectrum,  the case of inventories,  comparing  credit 
flows across periods with different inflation  rates should be done by 
measuring  flows as the change in deflated  levels of outstanding  credit. 
At the other end, where outstanding  debt is very large relative to the 
flows of activity being financed, the use of nominal  flows is approxi- 
mately correct even when comparing  periods with widely different  in- 
flation  rates. 
As an approximation  for an analysis  of credit  flows to business firms, 
we have grouped  credit flows into two broad categories. The first are 
predominantly  short-term  flows, consisting of business loans by banks 
and nonbank  sources plus commercial  paper. For these, we calculated 
the period-to-period  change in the deflated  value of credit outstanding 
and then multiplied  the implied  real flow by the price level of the pe- 
riod.12  In the second group  we placed predominantly  long-term  flows, 
consisting of mortgages  and corporate equity issues and bonds. For 
these, we simply used the annual  nominal  flows, which in turn  are the 
change in the nominal  value of outstanding  credit. Rather  than express 
the results as percentage  changes in the underlying  outstandings,  as is 
typically  done, we used nominal  GDP  as a denominator  metric,  in order 
to compare the relative magnitude  of changes both across time and 
among  different  types of credit  flows. 
In the case of short-term  flows, this technique  almost surely under- 
states the difference  between  the credit  flows in the recent  recession and 
those in the 1969-70, 1973-75,  and 1981-82  recessions, with their  higher 
inflation  rates. But  relying  on simple  differences  in nominal  outstandings 
would have severely overstated the slowdown in credit during  this re- 
cession compared  to the last three.  The opposite  bias is true  for the long- 
term credit flows. We think we have chosen the lesser of two evils. 
Nevertheless, because the deflated  version of short-term  credit  flows is 
12. The calculation  of the "deflated"  flows was, in fact, more complicated  than ex- 
plained  above. The flow of funds  time series on outstanding  credits  is characterized  by a 
number  of discontinuities,  reflecting  revisions,  alterations  in coverage,  and  other  statisti- 
cal  changes.  For  some  series  in some  periods,  therefore,  flows  are  not  accurately  measured 
by the change  in the level of credit  outstanding.  Therefore  we used a procedure  whereby 
the outstanding  value of a credit  market  liability  at end-of-quarter  t -  1 was calculated  by 
subtracting  the published  flow in quarter  t from  the outstanding  value  at end-of-quarter  t. 
This  yielded  a beginning  and  ending  value of outstanding  credit  for each quarter.  Each of 
these pairs  of values were then deflated  by the two-quarter  averages  of the surrounding 
GDP  deflators  and  their  difference  (the  deflated  flow)  was then  reinflated  with  the  quarterly 
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clearly imperfect,  even if the lesser of two evils, we also provide esti- 
mates of purely  nominal  flows, and will refer  to both these measures  in 
the discussion. We treat the demand  and supply of credit to the nonfi- 
nancial  business, first excluding  commercial  real estate mortgages  and 
then turning  to that sector. 
The Role  of the "Banking Crunch" 
That bank  credit  flows contract  during  recessions is hardly  a unique 
phenomenon.  Two necessary  conditions  must  be fulfilled  before  one can 
assign an exogenous role in causing  and/or  prolonging  the recession to 
developments  within  the banking  system itself. First, the credit  contrac- 
tion must not be merely a passive response to a slackening  demand  for 
credit brought  on by unfavorable  macroeconomic  developments  or the 
banking  sector's response to a tightening  of monetary  policy. Rather, 
the contraction  must arise from developments  within the banking  sys- 
tem itself which  reduce  the supply  of bank  loans. Second, other  financial 
intermediaries  and channels  between savers and investors must be un- 
able to take up the slack, or do so at more expensive terms and condi- 
tions of credit  supply. 
THE  BANK  CAPITAL  SHORTAGE.  With  respect to the first  condition, 
the specific culprit  often identified  as the villain  in the recent recession 
was a widespread  shortage  of bank  capital  brought  on by some combina- 
tion of three  factors. First was the increased  risk-based  capital  require- 
ments stemming  from  the 1988  Basle agreements  and  a further  stiffening 
of overall (unweighted)  capital requirements  by U.S. regulatory  agen- 
cies; these were further  strengthened  by the practice  of increasing  mini- 
mum capital requirements  for financially  troubled  banks. The second 
factor  was the massive  write-downs  of those bank  asset values  predomi- 
nantly  associated  with the collapse of the real estate boom of the 1980s. 
Third  was a toughened  set of loan evaluation  standards  used by bank 
regulators,  determined  not to be tarred  with the brush  of another  S&L 
fiasco. By forcing  a lower valuation  of some bank  loans, these new stan- 
dards  reduced  banks'  measured  capital. 
Those  banks with  impaired capital-asset ratios-most  of  them 
troubled  by a large volume of problem  loans-found  it difficult  to float 
new equity  as a means  of raising  capital  to meet the required  standards. 
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one of two steps to come into compliance with regulatory  standards; 
both involve a supply-side contraction of loan volume. If they have 
enough  capital  to meet the overall  (unweighted)  capital  requirements  but 
not the risk-based  measures,  banks  can shift their  portfolios  away from 
loans (which carry a high risk weight) to riskless short-term  Treasury 
securities. If banks fall short of the overall requirements,  they must 
shrink  their deposit base. Presumably,  they do so by reducing  the rate 
they pay on managed  liabilities. 
The evidence is fairly  strong  that  by the last years  of the 1980s,  capital 
shortages  began  to play a role in forcing  many  banks  to reduce lending. 
Bernanke  and  Lown document  that  in New England,  where  bank  capital 
shortages  have been particularly  severe, loan volume fell substantially 
further  than in other regions in 1990.13  They find  that in a regression  of 
bank  lending  across states, a variable  measuring  the size of capital-asset 
ratios has a significant  coefficient. A similar  result emerges from their 
analysis  of a cross-section  of individual  banks  in New Jersey. Joe Peek 
and Eric S. Rosengren, in a cross-sectional analysis of New England 
banks, find  that the rate of deposit growth  was positively correlated  to 
the level of capital-asset  ratios,  and  argue  that  the homogeneity  of condi- 
tions in the region  weakens the role of differences  in loan demand  as a 
potential  explanatory  factor.'4 
However, the significance  of these findings  as an explanation  for the 
recent economy-wide  behavior  of bank  loans is not straightforward.  As 
Bernanke  and  Lown point  out, the coefficient  of loan volume  on capital- 
asset ratios (in their state cross-sections) implies that, in the recent 
downturn,  only 2 to 3 percent of the 1988-90 decline in bank lending 
could be explained by changes in capital asset-ratios.'5  However, we 
question  the relevance  of applying  the cross-sectional  coefficient  on ab- 
solute changes  in the capital-asset  ratio  to estimate  the consequences of 
a tightening  of regulatory  standards.  Among  those banks  that comfort- 
ably meet capital standards,  differences  in capital-asset  ratios may ex- 
plain  little  of the difference  in loan volume. And  among  banks  faced with 
capital  shortages  because of changing  regulatory  standards,  a medium 
and  a substantial  shortage  may initially  elicit the same  response. Never- 
theless, the emergence of widespread capital shortages because of 
13.  Bernanke and Lown (1991). 
14.  Peek and Rosengren (1992). 
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soured  loans  or regulatory  changes  might  still have an important  impact, 
for a time, on aggregate  loan volume. 
On a conceptual  level, it is important  to remember  that, except per- 
haps  in New England,  insufficient  capital  was never a problem  afflicting 
more  than  a minority  of banks-albeit in some regions,  the minority  was 
substantial.  In a period  of weakness in loan demand,  it is quite possible 
that the unsatisfied  customers of banks that were short on capital and 
contracting  loans were, to some extent, accommodated  by stronger 
banks, taking some or all of the macroeconomic  sting out of the bank 
capital shortage, but still producing  a significant  correlation  between 
loan activity and capital-asset  ratios among individual  banks. (For a 
qualification  of this point, see the next section.) Nevertheless, taken al- 
together,  the evidence seems quite strong  that the supply  of bank  loans 
was indeed  constricted  in recent years by capital  shortages.  The ex  post 
data  on credit  flows presented  below are consistent  with the findings  re- 
ported  above in this regard.  But the literature  so far has not succeeded 
in pinning  down the magnitude  of the phenomenon,  either  absolutely  or 
in relationship  to the simultaneous  fall in the demand  for loans that  also 
occurred  over the period. 
ALTERNATIVE  SOURCES  OF  CREDIT.  When banks switch funds in 
their  portfolios  from  loans to Treasury  bills, the prior  holders  of T-bills 
find  themselves with "excess"  cash, which is likely to find  its way back 
into  the credit  markets.  And  when banks  discourage  the inflow  of depos- 
its by lowering  CD rates, the would-be depositors do not put the cash 
under  a mattress,  but make deposits elsewhere or purchase  alternative 
assets, such as mutual  fund shares or commercial  paper. Economists 
have long recognized  that  flows of credit  from  different  financial  institu- 
tions and sources are not perfect substitutes  for each other, and that 
monetary  policy operated,  in part,  because of that.  16  This  fact also moti- 
vates the new "credit  view" of how monetary  policy and the credit sys- 
tem work.'7  Banks and other financial  intermediaries  have evolved to 
deal with the asymmetry  of information  between potential borrowers 
and suppliers  of credit. Thus, customer-supplier  networks  and special- 
ized knowledge  about borrowers  are built up by individual  banks, and 
within  regional  banking  systems. As a consequence, when a widespread 
16. See, for example,  Gurley  and  Shaw  (1960)  and  Brainard  and  Tobin  (1963). 
17. This section draws  on Bernanke's  (1993)  excellent  exposition  of the "new  credit" 
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capital  shortage  forces banks  to curtail  loans, the flow  of credit  works its 
way through  other channels-only  at a higher cost in terms of rates, 
terms, and conditions.  And in some cases, the alternative  costs may be 
infinite,  in the sense that some borrowers  cannot access the alternative 
sources  at any cost. Many  of the alternative  channels  feature  securitized 
credit sold in national  markets,  to which many small  and regional  firms 
have no access; and, of course, the flotation of corporate stocks and 
bonds is not an alternative  for unincorporated  enterprises. 
This new credit view is consistent with the existence of credit ra- 
tioning  as described  by Joseph Stiglitz  and Andrew  Weiss, but does not 
depend  upon  it.  18  All that  is necessary  is that  the alternative  channels  are 
more costly. To the extent that this is the case, the result is equivalent 
to an upward  shift  in the LM curve in an IS-LM  model (with  the interest 
rate  to borrowers  on the vertical  axis). For a given monetary  policy, the 
spread widens between open market interest rates and the effective 
rates that  potential  borrowers  have to pay.  19 
To the extent that alternative sources of credit are indeed signifi- 
cantly imperfect  as substitutes for bank credit, establishing  the exis- 
tence of some substantial supply-side blockage in the flow of bank 
credit-for  example, a capital shortage-automatically yields the pre- 
sumption  that aggregate  demand  will be affected, because the effective 
cost of capital  will be raised. But this does not indicate  the magnitude  of 
the effect. 
EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE:  BORROWING  COSTS.  Because, according  to 
the credit view, nonbank sources of credit are only imperfect substi- 
tutes, a supply-based  contraction of bank credit arising from capital 
shortages should raise the effective cost of borrowing  (including  non- 
price terms  and conditions)  to business firms  relative  to market  interest 
rates. Unfortunately  it is difficult to test this hypothesis because of 
changes  in loan quality.  One of the characteristics  of a period  of credit- 
tightening  is the use of a more stringent  quality  screen by lenders. How- 
ever, no quality-weighted  index  of the cost of borrowing  exists. Thus  the 
simple  raw  figures  on the average  cost of borrowing  are  likely to conceal 
18. Stiglitz  and  Weiss  (1981).  See Bernanke  (1993,  p. 56). 
19. Bernanke  (1993)  prefers  to think  of this as a downward  shift in the IS curve (in a 
model  in which the opportunity  cost to money holders  is on the vertical  axis). For any 
given  rate  received  by holders  of near-money  assets, the effective  rate  faced  by boIrowers 
rises and  less investment  is undertaken.  For a formal  treatment  of the "credit"  view, see 
Bernanke  and  Blinder  (1988). 180  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
offsetting movements;  borrowing  costs for loans of given quality may 
rise, but this is masked in the reported  data by an increase in average 
loan quality. 
The evidence that does exist is skimpy. The spread between the 
prime  rate and the federal  funds rate widened during  the current  reces- 
sion, as it does in all recessions. But then, it continued  to rise to near- 
record  levels and remained  very high into early 1993.2?  The spread  be- 
tween personal  loan rates and the six-month  CD rate also widened dur- 
ing the recovery  to reach  new peaks in 1992.21  The prime  rate, however, 
is a notoriously  poor index of what is happening  to risk-adjusted  bor- 
rowing  costs. In any event, the behavior  of both these spreads  may be a 
simple artifact  of the sluggishness  of the current  recovery. The prime 
rate  and  personal  loan  rate  are  both  sticky  administered  prices;  the funds 
rate is highly  volatile, and the sluggishness  of the current  recovery has 
kept it low, unlike the more usual experience this far along into earlier 
recoveries. A calculation  of the spread  between the funds rate (or the 
CD rate) and the Fed-published  rate charged on short-term  business 
loans showed no systematic  movements  that  would illuminate  the prob- 
lem at hand. 
Unfortunately,  to assess the importance  of the bank  capital  shortage, 
we cannot rely on the evidence that might  be provided  by information 
on the price of credit;  thus we must  turn  to the much  more  difficult  task 
of trying  to draw  conclusions  from  ex  post  quantity  data. 
EMPIRICAL  EVIDENCE:  QUANTITIES.  Commercial  and  industrial 
(C&I)  bank  loans fell sharply  during  this recession and early recovery, 
both absolutely  and-more  importantly-in contrast  to earlier  business 
cycles. Over  the period  beginning  five quarters  before  the business  cycle 
peak and ending six quarters  after the peak, the outstanding  value of 
C&I  loans rose 35 percent  in the average  of the four recessions prior  to 
1990  (excluding  the recession of 1980);  in the current  recession they de- 
clined slightly over the entire period. A similar  difference  can be seen 
when loans are taken  as a ratio  to final  sales of business.22  Measured  by 
nominal  flows, the contraction  of bank  loans in the recent  recession was 
substantially  worse than in the other postwar recessions. But, as we 
20. See Cantor  and  Wenninger  (1993,  p. 10,  chart  3). 
21. Cantor  and  Wenninger  (1993,  p. 11,  chart  4). 
22. Cantor  and  Wenninger  (1993,  pp. 25-26, charts  29 and  30).  A similar  sharp  contrast 
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Table  8. Deflated  Short-term  Business  Credit  Flows  by Type of Lender  and Borrower 
Percent  of GDP 
Lender  and  Corporate  borrowers  Noncorporate  borrowers 
cycle phase  1969  1973  1981a  1990  1969  1973  1981a  1990 
Banks 
P-9  to P-5  0.35  0.36  0.13  0.30  0.03  0.02  0.10  -0.04 
P-4  to P  0.99  1.20  0.61  -0.21  0.18  0.21  0.01  -0.03 
T-2  to T+2  -0.27  -  1.19  0.74  -0.60  -0.03  0.05  -0.33  -0.21 
T+3  to T+7  0.36  -0.64  0.85  -0.49  0.02  0.01  0.20  -0.17 
Nonbanks 
P-9  to P-5  0.18  0.10  0.65  0.76  0.06  0.05  0.06  0.17 
P-4  to P  0.27  0.19  0.22  0.53  0.20  0.17  0.12  0.01 
T-2  to T+2  0.07  0.16  -0.31  -0.62  0.03  0.09  0.05  -0.08 
T+3  to T+7  0.10  0.22  1.06  -0.15  0.05  0.24  0.33  -0.12 
Source: Authors'  calculations  based on Board  of Governors  of the Federal  Reserve System, Flow of Funds 
Accounts  (nonfarm,  nonfinancial  business). 
a. In contrast  to previous  tables, the 1980  recession  is ignored,  and 1981:3  is used as the peak  of this recession. 
noted above, for loans with relatively short maturities,  there is a good 
case for using  the difference  in the deflated  value of outstandings  when 
comparing  periods  with widely different  inflation  experience. 
Tables 8, 9, and 10  present comparative  data on credit  flows to non- 
farm,  nonfinancial  business  from  bank  and  nonbank  sources  for the cur- 
rent  and  the three  prior  recessions, constructed  as described  earlier.  For 
each business cycle, average flows during  four periods are given: the 
two five-quarter  periods  ending  at the business  cycle peak, the five quar- 
ters centered  around  the cycle trough,  and  the succeeding  five quarters, 
ending  seven quarters  after the trough.  Table 8 summarizes  short-term 
flows: bank loans, loans from other sources, and commercial  paper. 
This table is based on the change in deflated  outstandings  (with the re- 
sulting  flows reinflated  to current  prices). The data are cross-classified 
as to bank and nonbank  sources (including  commercial  paper) and by 
corporate  and noncorporate  borrowers,  as a crude device to look at the 
difference  between  large  and  small  firms.  Table  9 provides  the same  data 
on nominal  flows. Finally, table 10  combines  corporate  and noncorpor- 
ate business  firms  and  bank  and  nonbank  sources  of funds, and  adds the 
flow of credit to business through  mortgages  (except for home mort- 
gages)  and  corporate  issues of stocks and  bonds. The data  on mortgages 
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Table  9. Nominal  Short-term  Business  Credit  Flows  by Type of Lender  and Borrower 
Percent  of GDP 
Lender  and  Corporate  borrowers  Noncorporate  borrowers 
cycle phase  1969  1973  1981a  1990  1969  1973  1981a  1990 
Banks 
P-9  to P-5  0.80  0.77  0.81  0.76  0.09  0.07  0.35  0.07 
P-4  to P  1.45  1.88  1.34  0.22  0.23  0.33  0.26  0.07 
T-2  to T+2  0.26  -0.30  1.12  -0.24  0.03  0.25  -0.23  -0.13 
T+3  to T+7  0.77  -0.17  1.26  -0.30  0.07  0.14  0.29  -0.13 
Nonbanks 
P-9  to P-5  0.27  0.20  0.96  1.05  0.15  0.13  0.30  0.34 
P-4  to P  0.37  0.34  0.58  0.83  0.29  0.31  0.38  0.17 
T-2toT+2  0.19  0.40  -0.13  -0.35  0.13  0.27  0.17  0.06 
T+3  to T+7  0.20  0.38  1.26  -0.02  0.13  0.37  0.46  -0.04 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  Flow  of  Funds 
Accounts  (nonfarm, nonfinancial business). 
a.  In contrast to previous  tables,  the  1980 recession  is ignored,  and 1981:3 is used as the peak of this recession. 
flows are aggregated  from  table 8, which is based on deflated  data. For 
comparability  among the various categories, all data are expressed as 
percentages  of GDP. 
The flow of bank  loans to both corporate  and noncorporate  business 
fell in the period  leading  up to the 1990-91  recession in a way not gener- 
ally matched  in other recessions. Indeed, the net flow of bank  credit to 
noncorporate  firms  turned  negative  as early as 1988,  an experience not 
matched  in the years preceding  earlier  downturns.  Nonbank  loans and 
commercial  paper  flows were reasonably  well-maintained  for corporate 
borrowers  during  the two years prior  to the 1990  business cycle peak. 
Although  nonbank  credit flows to noncorporate  borrowers  fell sharply 
in the year before the peak, that decline came a year later  than  the drop 
in bank credit. As might be expected, noncorporate  loans from other 
than banking  sources made up less of the post-1988 shortfall  in bank 
loans than  was the case for corporations,  but until  the recession contin- 
ued to be positive. 
This pattern  confirms  the earlier  conclusion, based on existing  litera- 
ture, that  the fall in bank  loans prior  to the current  recession-certainly 
in late 1988 and 1989 and probably  in 1990-was  significantly  driven 
from the supply side by emerging  capital problems. While we cannot 
measure  it, the shifting  of the flow of credit  away from  banking  into non- George L. Perry and Charles L. Schultze  183 
Table 10.  Total Quarterly Business Credit Flows and Major Components 
Percent of GDP 
Component  1969  1973  1981a  1990 
Total' 
P-9  to P-5  2.44  2.74  1.74  0.27 
P-4  to P  3.17  3.12  1.80  -0.22 
T-2  to T+2  2.65  1.21  1.26  -0.66 
T+3  to T+7  2.74  1.78  2.03  0.69 
Corporate  stocks and bonds 
P-9  to P-5  1.82  2.21  0.80  -0.92 
P-4  to P  1.53  1.34  0.84  -0.53 
T-2  toT+2  2.85  2.10  1.10  0.85 
T+3  toT+7  2.21  1.94  -0.41  1.63 
Short-term  corporate  and noncorporatel 
P-9  to P-5  0.62  0.53  0.94  1.19 
P-4  to P  1.64  1.78  0.96  0.31 
T-2  to T+2  -0.20  -0.89  0.16  -  1.51 
T+3  to T+7  0.53  -0.16  2.44  -0.94 
Mortgagesd 
P-9  to P-5  1.34  2.35  1.79  1.57 
P-4  to P  1.36  2.66  1.27  0.65 
T-2  to T+2  1.82  1.26  1.35  0.08 
T+3  to T+7  2.35  1.21  2.35  -0.58 
Source:  Authors'  calculations  based  on  Board  of  Governors  of  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  Flow  of  Funds 
Accounts  (nonfarm, nonfinancial business). 
a.  In contrast to previous  tables,  the  1980 recession  is ignored,  and 1981:3 is used as the peak of this recession. 
b.  Excludes  mortgages. 
c.  Short-term credit is from the deflated version,  table 8. Rounding differences  may occur. 
d.  Excludes  home mortgages. 
banking  channels almost surely raised the average  effective borrowing 
cost for business. And, as expected, the universe  of smaller  firms  in the 
noncorporate  sector did worse than the larger firms of the corporate 
world. 
During  the next two years of recession and relatively  slow recovery, 
short-term  flows to both corporate  and noncorporate  borrowers  turned 
sharply  negative, as shown in tables 8 and 10. Measured in deflated 
terms, the decline in total short-term  credit  flows was much  larger  than 
in the three historical  episodes in the recession year, and its behavior 
was also much worse in the recovery. A striking  fact is the degree to 
which  nonbank  sources of credit shared  in the decline. The conclusions 
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flows.23  For the smaller firms of the noncorporate  sector, the flow of 
nonbank  credit,  which  had  usually  remained  positive in other  recessions 
and  recoveries, was negative  in the latest recession and early  recovery. 
Some supply-side  forces may have contributed  to the constriction  of 
loan supplies  from  nonbank  sources. Some captive auto finance  compa- 
nies, which raise the bulk  of their  funds short  term  in public  credit  mar- 
kets, had  their  ratings  downgraded,  and  experienced  a sharp  rise in loan 
loss reserves.24  And  the fraction  of commercial  mortgages  in foreclosure 
among  life insurance  companies  rose far above prior  experience.25  But 
it is unlikely  that  these problems  impinged  heavily on the supply  of non- 
mortgage  credit  to most business firms. 
All in all, the fact that nonbank  credits fell so sharply  strongly  sug- 
gests that once the current  recession got well underway,  the principal 
force behind the drop in credit flows came from something  other than 
bank  capital  shortages  and other barriers  on the supply side. That con- 
clusion is strengthened,  for the corporate  sector, by the fact that  during 
the early  recovery, as was the case in earlier  cycles, corporations  floated 
large  amounts  of new stock and bond issues (see table 10);  some of the 
decline in the outstanding  value of corporate  bank and nonbank  credit 
represented  voluntary  refinancing. 
One important  fact that  emerges  from  the data  in tables  8, 9, and 10  is 
that  the aggregate  flow of short-term  credit  to business during  the reces- 
sion and early recovery, from  both bank  and nonbank  sources, was far 
below what it had been during  similar  stages of the three  earlier  cycles. 
And even when  corporate  flotations  of stocks and  bonds  are  added,  total 
flows of credit were depressed relative to earlier recession-recovery 
periods  (see the figures  for "total"  credit  flows in table 10). Because the 
recession of 1990-91  was shallower  than the average  of its three prede- 
cessors, it is a reasonable  conclusion  that  credit  flows fell by more than 
can be explained  by the behavior  of aggregate  demand.  The depressed 
level of credit flows continued  during  the recovery. Short-term  credit 
23. In the 1990-91  episode, the first  quarter  of the recession period  (T  -2  to T  + 2) 
overlaps  with the last quarter  of the peak  period  (P  - 4 to P). If the overlapping  quarter  is 
removed  from  the recession  period  average,  the decline  in deflated  total  short-term  credit 
during  the recession  is even greater  than  shown  in tables  8 through  10,  principally  because 
of the larger  fall  in nonbank  credit.  Conversely,  the issue of stocks  and  bonds  is greater  by 
a roughly  equal  amount. 
24. Cantor  and  Wenninger  (1993,  p. 16,  chart  14). 
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Table 11.  Short-term Credit Flows to Noncorporate Business 
Percent of GDP, current versus  three prior cyclesa 
Real version  Nominal version 
Cycle phase  Prior average  Current  Prior average  Current 
P-9  to P-5  0.11  0.13  0.36  0.41 
P-4  to P  0.30  -0.02  0.60  0.24 
T-2  to T+2  -0.05  -0.29  0.21  -0.07 
T+3  to T+7  0.28  -0.29  0.49  -0.17 
Source:  Authors' calculations  based on Federal Reserve,  Flow of Funds Accounts  (nonfarm, nonfincial business). 
a.  The three prior cycles  are those  used in tables 8-10. 
flows were substantially  negative;  but  they were also negative  to a small 
extent in the relatively strong recovery after the 1973-75 recession. 
Without  an explicit model of the complex relationships  between aggre- 
gate demand  and  credit  flows, it is impossible  to assess the implications 
of the weak  credit  flows  during  the recent  recovery. Their  weakness  may 
simply  reflect  the fact that  the recovery  itself was uniquely  sluggish. 
To the extent that the corporate-noncorporate  breakdown  provides 
information  on firm  size, the data suggest that smaller  firms,  like larger 
ones, experienced  very low flows of credit in the recent recession and 
recovery, as seen in table 11.  Unlike  corporations,  however, noncorpor- 
ate firms  were not able to issue stocks or bonds to help them refinance 
their  short-term  debt  obligations  or to tide them  over periods  of low cash 
flow. As we noted earlier,  credit  flows to noncorporate  businesses from 
both bank  and nonbank  lenders  slowed sharply. 
On  balance,  we read  the evidence as confirming  a definite  and  unique 
role  for bank  capital  shortages  in slowing  the economy during  the period 
leading  up to the onset of recession itself. During  the next two years, 
however, the decline  in nonbank  credit  flows relative  to past experience 
was also very large, suggesting  that once the recession got underway, 
factors other than bank capital shortages  became the principal  driving 
force. But the data  also provide  evidence that  the credit  decline was not 
solely an endogenous  response to overall weakness in the economy.26 
26. This  is essentially  the conclusion  reached  by Bernanke  (1993,  p. 65).  The  aggregate 
data,  however,  cannot  tell  the  full  story.  A number  of banks-even if a shrinking  number- 
remained  capital-constrained.  For many  smaller  firms  no reasonable  substitutes  for bank 
loans  exist. Within  an aggregate  dominated  by a depressed  demand  for loans, it is never- 
theless  quite  likely that  some potential  expansions  in activity  were eliminated  by the con- 
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Table  12. Change  in Nonresidential  Construction  during  Recession  and Recovery 
Percent  of beginning-of-period  GDP 
Peak to 
Peak  trough  T to T+7 
1960:2  0.3  0.2 
1969:4  -0.2  0.1 
1973:4  -0.4  -0.2 
1981:3  -0.1  0.2 
1990:3  -0.3  -0.6 
Source:  Authors' calculations  based on NIPA. 
The magnitude  of the slowdown in credit flows during  the recession it- 
self appears  to have been larger  than can reasonably  be explained by 
movements  in aggregate  demand.  Something  else-beyond  either  bank 
capital  shortages  or weak aggregate  demand-appears to have been at 
work  to depress  the volume  of business  credit. We were unable  to deter- 
mine  whether  the continued  weakness  of credit  flows in the early  recov- 
ery was simply  an endogenous  response  to the sluggishness  of the recov- 
ery itself or also the result  of other  forces. 
The Special Case of Nonresidential  Real Estate 
Table 12, based on quarterly  data  in constant  prices, summarizes  the 
contribution  of nonresidential  construction  to the change  in GDP  during 
the recent recession and  the first  seven quarters  of recovery, compared 
to past  cyclical experience. Because multifamily  construction  and  mort- 
gage  lending  fell very sharply  during  this recession and  early  recovery- 
and  for the sake of completeness  in the coverage  of business  credit-we 
have included  this category in the total. But for ease in nomenclature, 
we refer  to the total as nonhousing  construction.  The downward  drag  of 
lagging  nonresidential  construction  has been particularly  marked  during 
the recovery.27 
Both the demand  and supply  of loans for commercial  real estate col- 
lapsed  in the past two years. The history of extensive overbuilding  and 
mounting  vacancy rates in shopping  centers, office buildings, and re- 
lated structures  in the 1980s  is well documented.  The subsequent  col- 
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lapse of the boom and  the resulting  huge markdowns  of commercial  real 
estate loans in bank and other institutional  portfolios became an im- 
portant  contributing  factor to the emergence  of bank-capital  shortages. 
To a lesser extent, but still significantly,  the flow of mortgages  on multi- 
family residential  properties  also fell sharply, and turned negative in 
1991  and 1992.  The final section of table 10 summarizes  the recent be- 
havior  of mortgage  loans (excluding  home mortgages),  and shows how 
far that behavior departs from historical  experience. The demand  for 
such  credit  has obviously  fallen  precipitously,  and  is likely  to remain  low 
for some time. But it is also possible that a major  source of the wide- 
spread  views and  plentiful  anecdotes  about  the stringency  of bank  credit 
is the recently acquired  hostility of bank  managers  and bank  regulators 
toward financing  commercial or developmental real estate projects. 
While it is possible that a few scattered  viable commercial  projects  are 
being  held up by the attitudes  of managers  and regulators,  the dramatic 
fall of  commercial mortgage lending is  essentially a  demand phe- 
nomenon. 
Problems  with Business  Balance  Sheets 
We noted above that during  the last recession, business credit  flows 
were lower than  could be explained  by either  bank  capital  shortages  or 
weakness in economy-wide aggregate  demand. One widely held-but 
also disputed-hypothesis  attributes  important  responsibility  for the 
historically  depressed  volume of business credit  flows to balance sheet 
problems  of highly  leveraged  business firms,  and  argues  that this devel- 
opment helped bring  on the recession and has continued  to retard  the 
recovery.28 
The ratio of the debt of nonfinancial  business firms to their GDP, 
which  had  been trendless  during  the 1960s, 1970s  and  the first  half  of the 
1980s, rose sharply  thereafter.  The development, spread, and in some 
cases, abuse  ofjunk  bond  financing  during  the 1980s,  and  the problem  of 
burdensome  interest obligations  encountered  by some firms  earlier  in- 
volved in leveraged buyouts, attracted  much publicity. Similarly,  the 
dramatic  collapse of commercial  real estate values caused major and 
28. For a statement  of the view, see Friedman  (1991, 1992)  and Bernanke  (1993).  For 
a skeptical  evaluation  of the potential  contractionary  role of rising  corporate  debt, see 
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highly visible financial  difficulties  for many excessively leveraged real 
estate developers. (About three-quarters  of outstanding  commercial 
real  estate mortgages  have been issued by households  and  noncorporate 
firms.)  A very high  amount  of debt in business balance  sheets can affect 
both  the demand  and  the supply  of credit.  The existence of interest  pay- 
ment  obligations  that  have become very high  relative  to cash flow inhib- 
its firms'  willingness  to invest in risky  projects. The same phenomenon 
can simultaneously  downgrade  the quality  of the borrowing  firm  to po- 
tential  lenders, and thereby  raise the cost of capital  or cause the firm  to 
be screened  out of consideration  when credit  is being  rationed. 
To assess the potential importance  of these balance sheet develop- 
ments, we start  with some aggregate  and  average  measures.  It is not that 
the averages  and aggregates  are themselves so significant,  but they can 
serve as an index as to what might  be happening  among  the most inter- 
est-burdened  10 or 20 percent  of corporations,  whose unusual  financial 
difficulties  could arguably  provide a drag on economic recovery. One 
important  measure  of the potential  problem  of excessive corporate  debt 
is the extent of the rise in the burden  of corporate  interest  payments  on 
corporate  revenues  and  cash flow. Figure  5 provides several  alternative 
indexes. The first  is the ratio  of interest  payments  by nonfinancial  corpo- 
rations  to their  gross domestic product.  That ratio has trended  upward 
for decades, reaching  local peaks in recessions. A very similar  pattern, 
also seen in the lower panel of figure  5, is evident in the ratio  of interest 
payments  to gross cash flow, defined  as corporate  profits  plus deprecia- 
tion and interest  payments  minus corporate  profits  taxes. But until the 
mid-1980s,  the entire  rise in the ratio  of interest  payments  to GDP, or to 
cash flow, had  been due to an upward  secular  drift  in the effective inter- 
est rate on corporate  debt. Furthermore,  the ratio  of debt itself to GDP, 
or to cash flow of nonfinancial  corporations,  was trendless.  This is cap- 
tured  by the line in figure  5 that shows the ratio of interest  payments  to 
GDP  calculated  over the entire  period  at a constant  average  effective in- 
terest rate  on corporate  borrowings  (at the average 1983-90  level). This 
ratio  is, of course, an index  of the ratio  of corporate  debt  to GDP.29  Start- 
ing in the mid 1980s,  that ratio  began  to rise sharply,  reaching  a peak in 
early 1991. 
29. The average  effective corporate  borrowing  rate was calculated  as the ratio  of the 
NIPA estimate of net interest paid by nonfinancial  corporations  to the end-of-quarter 
credit  market  debt  of such  nonfinancial  corporations.  The  flow  of funds  data  on the debt  of 
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Figure 5.  Ratio of Net Interest to GDP and to Cash Flow for Nonfinancial Corporations 
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Source:  Authors' calculations  using nonfinancial corporate cash flow, net interest, and GDP from NIPA,  and total 
nonfarm, nonfinancial corporate credit market instruments from the Federal Reserve,  Flow of Funds data. 
a  The constant  interest rate measure uses the average  1983-90 effective  interest rate on corporate borrowing. See 
the text for further details. 
In the last several  years, the ratio  of interest  payments  to GDP  and  to 
cash flow has fallen very substantially,  bringing  it back to where it was 
in the mid-1980s  before the debt explosion began. But it is clear from 
figure  5 that  the largest  part  of the decline  in the interest  burden  has come 
corporations  includes,  farm  corporations.  The error  introduced  by this difference,  how- 
ever, should  be quite  small.  The interest-to-GDP  ratio  at constant  interest  rates shown  in 
figure  5 represents  a simple  arithmetic  calculation;  it does not, of course, simulate  what 
would  have happened  had interest  rates over the entire  period  actually  been constant  at 
the  level of 1983-90.  In that  case, many  other  economic  developments,  including  possibly 
the debt-to-GDP  ratio,  would  have  been different. 190  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
not from  a declining  debt ratio  but  from  falling  interest  rates.30  The ratio 
of debt  to GDP  and  the ratio  of interest  payments  to cash flow  at constant 
levels of interest  rates have fallen, but modestly. Despite the recent im- 
provement in the interest-to-cash-flow  ratios, lenders and borrowers 
could well be concerned that the interest rates underlying  those ratios 
are unrepresentative  of future  prospects. That would hardly  be an un- 
reasonable  fear  given the unusually  steep yield curve that  has character- 
ized the last few years. And the fact that many corporations  have re- 
cently begun to substitute  substantial  amounts  of long-term  bonds for 
short-term  debt despite the highly  unfavorable  yield curve suggests that 
they were fearful  of future increases in short-term  rates.3'  Short-term 
(ninety-day)  commercial  paper  rates in the first  quarter  of 1993  were 3.2 
percent; with the GDP deflator  rising at a 3.3 percent rate, real rates 
were about zero. In 1988  and 1989,  and also during  the longer  period  of 
1985  to 1990,  real  commercial  paper  rates  averaged  in the neighborhood 
of 4 percent. In assessing risks (as opposed to making  best forecasts), 
prudent  lenders and potential  borrowers  would surely not rule out the 
possibility  of a return  partway  back  to those levels sometime  during  the 
next five years as an accompaniment  to cyclical recovery in a world of 
low private saving rates and still substantial  budget deficits. Thus the 
level of the debt-to-GDP  ratio may be more relevant  than the interest- 
to-cash  flow ratio  in forming  the attitudes  of both  borrowers  and  lenders 
about  the risk  of additional  credit  extensions. 
While  an upward  movement  in rates  would not cause cash flow prob- 
lems for most firms,  it could be troublesome  for those highly  leveraged 
firms  that have not yet succeeded in substantially  reducing  their debt. 
Such firms  are, therefore,  likely  to continue  to give high  priority  to using 
their  cash flow and  their  access to financial  markets  to reduce  and  to ex- 
tend the maturity  of their  debts, rather  than  to expand  their  operations. 
30. Remolona  and  others  (1993,  p. 15)  have estimated  that  nine-tenths  of the reduced 
interest  payments  in 1991  and 1992  are attributable  to lower short-term  interest  rates and 
that  only 10  percent  to corporate  refinancing. 
31. Remolona  and  his coauthors  (1993,  p. 15,  table  4) estimate  that  $87  billion  of corpo- 
rate  short-term  debt  was replaced  by long-term  debt  in 1991-92  at an  added  annual  interest 
cost of $3.5 billion.  Some of the motivation  was undoubtedly  to reduce  the risk  of having 
to roll over large short-term  credits  in the face of credit  rationing  and very unfavorable 
nonprice  terms  and conditions.  But some of the willingness  to accept higher  immediate 
interest  costs may have also reflected  pessimistic  views about  future  interest  rate pros- 
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And to the extent that lenders evaluate credit risks with an eye to the 
possibility of future interest rate increases, their assessment of the 
creditworthiness  of these firms  will be more unfavorable  than  would be 
suggested  by evaluating  their  prospects  at today's interest  rates. 
So far we have considered  only aggregate  data. But the inhibiting  ef- 
fect on both borrowers  and lenders of past increases in leverage will 
principally  be concentrated  among  those firms  with  the highest  leverage. 
In 1988, Bernanke  and John Y. Campbell  simulated  a rerun  of firm  ex- 
periences in the 1973-75  and 1981-82 recessions on a sample of 1,200 
firms,  taking  into account  their  actual 1986  debt-equity  and  coverage  ra- 
tios.32  Together  with Toni M. Whited, they later repeated the experi- 
ment with firms' 1988  balance sheet and income ratios.In  the latter  ex- 
periment,  they found that a rerun  of 1973-75  would threaten  about 25 
percent of the firms  with insolvency, with simulated  debt-asset ratios 
greater  than unity.33  The better stock market  performance  of 1982  kept 
the increases  in simulated  debt-asset  ratios  to a modest  amount,  but  very 
substantial  liquidity  problems  emerged  for about  20 percent  of the firms 
because of interest expenses in excess of cash flow. The authors  also 
found  that  increases  in debt-asset  ratios  over the 1980s  had  not been par- 
ticularly  concentrated  among cyclically stable firms. The depth of the 
1991  recession was much  less than  the earlier  two and the stock market 
behaved relatively  favorably. But it is nevertheless quite possible that 
considerations  similar  to those raised by the simulations  of Bernanke 
and  his colleagues may have played a role on both the demand  and sup- 
ply side in producing  the unusually  large  drop  in business  borrowing  dur- 
ing the latest recession and early recovery, with an attendant  inhibition 
on the volume of real  investment  activity. 
In another  recent study, Eli M. Remolona  and others examined  the 
factors behind the upsurge  in corporate  stock and bond financing  that 
has occurred  in the past several years.34  They concluded  that  the bulk  of 
the new issues were devoted not to business expansion but to making 
up for subpar  cash flows (depleted  by heavy interest  payments)  and to 
deleveraging.  Of the fifty largest new equity issues by seasoned firms 
during  the eighteen  months  prior  to July 1992,  44  percent  (by value)  were 
issued  by firms  losing money at the time of issuance and  another  36 per- 
32.  Bernanke and Campbell (1988). 
33.  Bernanke, Campbell, and Whited (1990, p. 269). 
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cent by firms  with a ratio of debt to book equity of more than 70 per- 
cent.35  The study's authors  argue  that  "U.S. corporations  found  manag- 
ing their debt in  a period of  weak cash flow more difficult than 
anticipated."36  During  the 1980s,  the argument  had been advanced  that 
precisely because creditors  in a very leveraged  firm  would be exposed 
to severe and early losses in case of cash flow difficulties,  they would 
have great incentive to agree on early intervention  and a reduction  in 
their  claims before bankruptcy  occurred.  But as Remolona  and his col- 
leagues  point  out, that  outcome  was made  more  difficult  "by  the prolifer- 
ation of creditor  classes during  the leveraging  boom of the 1980s."  37  It 
turned  out to be hard  to get the different  classes to agree  on a refinancing 
proposal.  Thus during  1991  and 1992,  an important  fraction  of U.S. cor- 
porations  had  to use their  access to the long-term  credit  markets  to cope 
with the residue of the 1980s leveraging  boom, rather  than to finance 
expansion. 
In summary,  financial  developments  almost surely did contribute  to 
the macroeconomic  problems  of the past three years. The shortage  of 
bank  capital  had some responsibility  for the slowdown in economic ac- 
tivity that began in 1989.  As the slowdown turned  into a recession, the 
evidence-particularly  the fact that nonbank credit flows also fell 
sharply-suggests  that factors other than bank capital shortages took 
over as the driving  force in the credit  slowdown. Those other  factors  in- 
cluded not only the developing  weakness in the aggregate  demand  for 
goods and  services, but  also the effects of the sharp  rise in business  debt 
burdens  during  the 1980s.  The enlarged  debt  burdens  reduced  the credit- 
worthiness  of many  business borrowers  in the eyes of potential  lenders 
and  raised  the potential  bankruptcy  risk  of borrowing  for many  potential 
borrowers,  thereby  reducing  their willingness  to undertake  real activi- 
ties that  required  an increase  in debt liabilities. 
Some Recent  Improvements 
We concluded above that once the recession started, factors other 
than  bank  capital  shortages  played the dominant  role in the contraction 
of credit  flows, and  that these in turn  may have partly  been the result  of 
35. Remolona  and  others  (1992,  p. 12,  table 1). 
36. Remolona  and  others  (1992,  p. 3). 
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an earlier  deterioration  in business  balance  sheets. But in the absence of 
improvements,  deficiencies  in bank  capital  positions could reemerge  as 
a constraint  to financing  the rapid  credit  expansion  needed once the re- 
covery became more  vigorous. In fact, however, bank  capitalization  ra- 
tios and other indicators  of health have been improving.  By the end of 
1992,  the ratio  of equity  capital  to assets among  FDIC-insured  commer- 
cial banks  had  risen  to 7.52 percent  from  its low of 6.02 percent  in 1987.38 
The assets of FDIC-insured  commercial  banks classified as problem 
banks reached a peak in 1991 at 15.4 percent of total year-end bank 
assets; that  ratio  had  dropped  to 11.6  percent  a year later.39 
We have not been able provide a quantitative  assessment of the ex- 
tent to which bank  capital  ratios  and business balance  sheets remain  an 
actual or potential  constraint  on the speed of economic recovery. The 
improvements  to date have obviously  relaxed  the constraints,  and  those 
improvements  are  likely  to continue.  But  to the extent that  we have been 
correct in arguing  that business balance sheets have been a restraining 
factor on business expansion-from  the standpoint  of both the supply 
and  demand  for credit-the  improvement  that  has occurred  to date does 
not appear  to have been sufficient  to have removed  completely  the con- 
straints.  To put this in perspective, however, recall  from the earlier  re- 
sults that it was consumer  spending,  not business outlays on producers 
equipment and inventories, which was surprisingly  weak in this re- 
covery. 
Conclusion 
We have been able to tag the recent recession and subsequent  slug- 
gish  recovery  as clearly  unusual  in that-unlike its predecessors-it  was 
not primarily  driven  by a combination  of policy changes  and  autoregres- 
sive responses by other forces weakening  total demand. We have pin- 
pointed the weakness in consumption  as the most important  locus of 
negative shocks, and have suggested that it arose in part  from the de- 
pressing  effect on consumer  confidence stemming  from weak employ- 
ment growth and from the unusual  prevalence of permanent-as  con- 
trasted with  temporary-layoffs.  Additionally, we  believe,  lesser 
38.  FDIC (1992, p. 5). 
39.  FDIC (1992, p. 5). 194  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
shocks have arisen from early constraints  on credit expansion arising 
from banks' capital shortages;  the 1980s  overbuilding  and subsequent 
collapse in the market  for commercial  construction,  as well as the effect 
on lenders'  financial  strength  from  the associated  fall in the value of real 
estate loans; and some inhibitions  on credit expansion following from 
the deterioration  in business balance  sheets during  the 1980s. 
More recently, bank profitability,  capital ratios, and stock values 
have been improving,  lessening whatever  residue of problems still re- 
mains  from  the bank  capital  shortage.  While  the overall  ratio  of interest 
payments  to GDP  and  to cash flow among  nonfinancial  corporations  has 
improved substantially,  the largest part of that improvement  has re- 
sulted  from  falling  interest  rates, rather  than  from  reductions  in debt rel- 
ative to GDP. Because of this, an important  part of the improvement 
could be reversed  with a future  rise in interest  rates, and anticipation  of 
this could still be a constraint  on some potential  debt-financed  activities 
among  the most affected  firms. 
APPENDIX 
The Velocity of M2 around Recessions 
WE  HAVE  USED  CHANGES  in the federal funds rate as the most useful 
characterization  of monetary  policy. As noted  in the text, the variability 
of the various  monetary  aggregates  relative  to other  economic variables 
has kept the Federal  Reserve from using such measures  as their  instru- 
mental  target  during  most of the postwar  period.  Table  A-  I summarizes 
Table  Al.  Percentage  Change  in M2 Velocity  around  Recessions 
Percentage  points 
Annual rate 
Recession  (P-4)  to P  P to T  T to (T+5)  T to (T+ 7)  P to T 
1960:2-1961:1  0.3  -4.5  0.7  -1.2  -6.0 
1969:4-1970:4  2.6  -1.2  -3.3  -4.4  -1.2 
1973:4-1975:1  3.9  0.2  -  1.5  -3.2  0.2 
1980:1-1982:4  2.1  -5.7  0.3  0.8  -2.1 
1990:3-1991:1  0.0  -  1.1  2.5  4.5  -  2.1 
Mean, excluding  1990-91  2.2  -2.8  -  1.0  -2.0  -2.3 
Mean  1.8  -2.5  -0.3  -0.7  -2.2 
Standard deviation  1.4  2.3  2.0  3.1  2.1 
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the changes  in M2  velocity during  recession subperiods,  in the same  for- 
mat as was used for other variables. The standard  deviations of those 
changes across the various subperiods  are typically more than half as 
large  as the standard  deviations  of changes  in GDP itself, as reported  in 
text table 1. Comments 
and Discussion 
Benjamin M.  Friedman: The subject of  this stimulating  paper by 
George  Perry  and  Charles  Schultze-broadly defined,  the nature  of eco- 
nomic  fluctuations-is obviously an issue of very long standing.  The pa- 
per's,  title is perhaps  a self-conscious echo of the Tolstoian  notion that 
while expanding  economies are all alike, every contracting  economy is 
contracting  in its own way. The title  notwithstanding,  the paper's  princi- 
pal conclusion is that the U.S. economy's contraction  in 1990-91  was 
pretty much like other contractions.  What  was unusual  was the period 
leading  up to that contraction  and, even more so, the recovery that has 
followed. 
In their  analysis  of the end of the 1983-90  expansion,  the main  puzzle 
framed  by Perry  and  Schultze  is why the recession  took so long to begin. 
Their  analysis  focuses in particular  on the false signal  given by the fed- 
eral  funds  rate, which they adopt  as their  primary  indicator  of monetary 
policy. The nominal  federal funds rate began to rise sharply in early 
1988,  peaked  in March  of 1989,  and  had  been steadily  declining  for a year 
and a quarter  before the recession began. As Perry  and Schultze point 
out, price inflation  was sufficiently  stable  during  this period  that  the real 
federal  funds  rate mostly tracked  the nominal  rate. 
Although  they do not say so, this is the same problem  thrown  up by 
substantially  all familiar  indicators  of monetary  policy during  the epi- 
sode that  they examine.  M2  growth,  for example-taken as either  nomi- 
nal or real-declined  sharply  in early 1987,  and  it has remained  low ever 
since. Bank loan growth moved more or less in step with M2 growth. 
The spread between the commercial  paper rate and the Treasury  bill 
rate, an indicator  on which Kenneth  Kuttner  and  I have focused in some 
recent work, rose as early as late 1987  to levels that almost always pre- 
dict recessions, then declined, again  rose to recession-indication  levels 
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in early 1989, but then declined to clearly nonrecession levels by late 
1989,  long before  the recession occurred.  The spread  between  long-  and 
short-term  interest rates, an indicator  that other researchers  have em- 
phasized, as have many market  practitioners,  likewise gave a false sig- 
nal, predicting  a recession long before  one occurred  and  then switching 
to nonrecession  levels just before the recession began. At least from a 
monetary  and financial  perspective, therefore,  the period  leading  up to 
the 1990-91  recession was clearly  unusual. 
What has been even more extraordinary-and what now matters 
more  importantly  for current  policy purposes-is  the shape  of the recov- 
ery. As Perry  and Schultze document  in some detail, real growth  since 
the 1991  trough  has been extraordinarily  slow compared  to prior  U.S. 
recovery episodes. Moreover,  because productivity  has grown so rap- 
idly, employment  growth has been even slower. As the exchange be- 
tween the Perry-Schultze  paper  and Robert  Gordon's  paper  in this vol- 
ume highlights,  the extremely slow job growth during  this recovery is 
an interesting  phenomenon  in its own right.  Further,  as recent evidence 
introduced  by James  Medoff  has indicated,  measures  ofjob availability 
turn  out to be good predictors  of consumer  confidence,  as well as,  of vo- 
ting behavior in elections. Perry and Schultze politely ignore the fact 
that  a presidential  election took place eighteen  months  into this sluggish 
recovery, and so they do not speculate  about  whether  the election might 
have turned out differently  had growth of real income-or,  more im- 
portantly,  unemployment-been more  rapid  during  this period. 
The main  question  is, why is this so? Why have real output  and em- 
ployment  been so weak? Perry  and Schultze's regressions  clearly indi- 
cate that the weakness has not been due to causal  factors  readily  identi- 
fiable  with monetary  or fiscal policy, at least not in the usual sense, and 
this finding  confirms  the conventional  wisdom  on this subject. 
Because intellectual  discourse abhors  a vacuum, it is not surprising 
that many people have suggested other potential explanations  for the 
sluggishness of the recovery. (Some of these potential explanations 
even have the competitive  advantage  of having  been offered  in advance 
of the event.) Among  these, the one on which  Perry  and  Schultze  choose 
to focus-rightly,  in my judgment-is  the financial strain associated 
with  the corporate-leverage  movement  of the 1980s. 
There are two distinct sides of this argument.  The first  is that rising 
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ity to undertake  expansionary  activities  that  they otherwise  would have 
pursued.  Perry  and Schultze have followed the recent literature  in con- 
sidering  these debt burdens  from  the perspective  of both stocks (that  is, 
balance  sheet relations)  and  flows (that  is, interest-coverage  ratios).  The 
authors  nicely document  the extraordinary  extent to which U.S. corpo- 
rations  leveraged  themselves  during  the years spanning  1984  to 1989.  Al- 
though  they do not say so explicitly, what is most relevant  here is that 
the unprecedented  volume of debt issued by nonfinancial  corporations 
during  this period  was not the counterpart  of financing  a boom in invest- 
ment. No investment  surge  took place during  this period.  More  than  half 
of the entire  net volume  of debt  issues by U.S. nonfinancial  corporations 
during  this period simply went into one or another  kind of transaction 
that, in effect, paid  down the corporate  sector's equity. 
On the basis of this unprecedented  development,  several  researchers 
(myself  included)  had  earlier  expressed  concerns  that  if a big enough  re- 
cession came along, defaults on this debt might become sufficiently 
widespread  to threaten  the integrity  of the U.S.  financial  system in a 
broader  sense. This  did  not happen,  at least in  part  because  in the end the 
recession was not all that  severe. But many  researchers  (again,  I include 
myself) had also argued  that, even without  any systemic discontinuity, 
these debt burdens  would impair  the economy's ability  to mount  a sus- 
tained recovery after the recession ended. My reading of the Perry- 
Schultze  paper  is that  it nicely provides  evidence that  the excessive cor- 
porate  debt burdens  inherited  from the 1980s  have indeed had  just this 
effect. 
A second aspect of how the financial  events of the 1980s have de- 
pressed  economic  growth  in the 1990s  is the impaired  capacity  of lenders 
to provide  credit. This too is a familiar  subject. It is also a difficult  sub- 
ject because it is so hard  to identify  demand  shocks from  supply  shocks 
in the credit  markets. 
Suppose, for example, that the only shock that has hit the economy 
is some negative shock to credit supply. Further  suppose that, because 
of this negative  shock to credit  supply,  there  is a reduction  in the pace of 
aggregate  nonfinancial  economic activity. For any or all of the standard 
reasons, this decline in nonfinancial  activity is likely to lead, in turn, to 
a decline in the demand  for credit. Both bankers  and economists might 
even look at the results  after  the fact and  conclude  that  much  of what  had 
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shock to have affected the economy in the first place was a shock to 
credit  supply. Especially  when we realize how noisy our  measurements 
of the relevant  prices are in this market-that is, how poor a measure  of 
the cost of credit  the posted interest  rate  usually  is-it  is easily conceiv- 
able that the econometrician,  coming  along after  the fact, could look at 
the evidence and conclude that the extent of the disturbance  to eco- 
nomic activity attributable  to credit supply  was not significantly  differ- 
ent from zero and therefore attribute  the entire episode to something 
else. 
Despite these difficulties,  there is a growing  body of evidence sup- 
porting  the conclusion that negative supply shocks in the credit market 
have played a meaningful  role in accounting  for the recent unprece- 
dented  decline in the pace of net credit  extensions in the United States, 
among commercial  banks in particular.  Perry  and Schultze reexamine 
the available  evidence on this subject  and likewise reach  the same con- 
clusion. I agree. 
I differ with their interpretation  of this evidence in two ways, how- 
ever. First, they correctly note that net credit extensions slowed not 
only at commercial  banks but at thrifts, life insurance  companies, fi- 
nance companies, and other major  categories of lending institutions. 
They interpret  this broader  credit  slowdown  as reflecting  a decline  in the 
demand  for credit. But among  these other  kinds  of lenders, no less than 
at the banks, it is plausible to believe that the accumulation  of large 
write-downs  of loan values, and hence of firm capital, negatively af- 
fected credit supply  in a way quite parallel  to what happened  at banks. 
Among life insurance  companies, the leading  example in this regard  is 
the Equitable,  the country's  third  largest  life insurance  company,  which 
experienced loan losses so severe that it had to change from a mutual 
company to a stock company in order to receive a cash infusion by 
which  the company  was, in effect, sold to a French  insurer.  Among  non- 
bank  finance  companies,  the leading  example  is probably  Westinghouse 
Credit,  which experienced such large  losses that the company  has, for 
all practical  purposes, exited from the lending business. In short, the 
pervasiveness of the credit slowdown across different categories of 
lenders  is not necessarily evidence that this was a demand-driven  phe- 
nomenon. It merely demonstrates  how broadly U.S. financial  institu- 
tions participated  in the excessive credit extensions that preceded the 
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The other  way in which I differ  from  Perry  and Schultze's interpreta- 
tion is that I would draw  just such a connection, which they do not, be- 
tween the negative supply shock to credit markets  during  1990-92  and 
the excessive leverage assumed by nonfinancial  corporations  during 
1984-89. A fundamental  but often overlooked truism  of all credit mar- 
kets is that every borrower's  liability  is some lender's asset, and vice 
versa. The relevant  implication  in the current  context is that every de- 
fault  by a borrower  represents  a shrinkage  in the capital  of some lender. 
Moreover,  when lenders  are firms  whose own securities  trade  in ration- 
ally speculative markets,  every increase in the perceived likelihood  of 
default  by a borrower  also leads to a decline  in the capital  of some lender 
as priced  in the market. 
In their  analysis, Perry  and Schultze  associate negative  credit  supply 
shocks only with commercial  banks, and even for banks they attribute 
these negative supply shocks to the excessive lending  that went before 
only in the limited (albeit  very important)  context of real estate loans. 
While much detailed firm-level  research would be necessary to prove 
the point, I suspect that defaults  and increases in the probability  of de- 
faults on loans undertaken  by ordinary  nonfinancial  companies, apart 
from  real estate, also played a significant  role in impairing  the capital  of 
banks  and  other  lenders  during  this period. 
In sum, the Perry-Schultze  paper usefully reminds  us that not only 
the antecedents of the 1990-91 recession, but especially the recovery 
that  has followed it, have differed  from  prior  U.S. experience. And they 
have added  to the growing  literature  calling  attention  to the importance 
of credit market  phenomena  in accounting  for the sluggish  recovery in 
particular.  The paper  is a welcome contribution  in both respects. 
James Tobin: A good Brookings  Panel paper asks the central policy- 
related  questions  of the day, and tries to illuminate  them and  if possible 
answer  them with the help of sound theoretical  and empirical  analysis, 
applied  with  common  sense. The Perry-Schultze  study  of the macroeco- 
nomic scene certainly  lives up to that tradition.  This ambitious  paper 
covers a vast territory,  conveys a great  deal of information,  and  reaches 
important  and sometimes surprising  conclusions. If it does not answer 
all the questions  it asks and  raises some new ones-well,  that, too, is an 
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Is the latest recession different?  Yes, but the difference  lies not so 
much in the three quarters  technically  dated as a recession by the Na- 
tional  Bureau  of Economic  Research  (NBER)  as in the preceding  eleven 
"recovery"  quarters  and the subsequent  five or more "recovery"  quar- 
ters. The closest parallel  seems to be the 1969-71  recession, also a shal- 
low and short interlude  between slow-growth  periods. The analysis is 
complicated  by the method  of dating.  In the course of my comments, I 
will argue  for a cyclical dating  system that  takes as par  for the economy 
its potential  real growth  rate, rather  than zero. By that scoring  system, 
the U.S. economy fell into recession in 1989:2  and did not emerge  until 
1992:3,  if then. In that  light,  many  of the symptoms  of weakness  over the 
past four years do not seem so surprising. 
What  caused  the growth  recession that  began  in 1989:2?  George  Perry 
and Charles  Schultze find that the Federal  Reserve overdid  its precau- 
tionary  tightening  in the year prior  to the recession. They show that the 
Fed pushed  the federal  funds  rate  to very high  levels compared  with  pre- 
vious prerecession  episodes. Figure 2 of the paper suggests that over- 
tightening  began  in 1988.  Yet it is hard  to fault  the Fed for leaning  harder 
against  the wind as the long recovery whittled the unemployment  rate 
down toward  5 percent.  The Fed is more  vulnerable  to criticism  for fail- 
ing to reduce the federal  funds rate  faster and more decisively once the 
economy starts to weaken. Indeed the unusual financial  obstacles to 
credit  flows, often cited by Chairman  Alan  Greenspan  and  other  Federal 
Reserve officials, should  have been reasons for deviating  from the nor- 
mal  policy reaction  function  in the direction  of ease. Perhaps  the central 
bank, failing  to arrest  the slowdown by timely and decisive action, let 
the economy slip  from  the grasp  of its ordinary  remedial  policies. 
Among  Reaganomics  conservatives, it is axiomatic  that  the 1990  tax 
increase  was the culprit.  But by that  time, the economy was already  in a 
growth  recession. Figure  2 of the paper  shows fiscal  policy tightening  in 
1986-87, as gauged by the high-employment  surplus ratio. But ever 
since a temporary  dip in 1988,  it has been pretty stable. If supply-siders 
are looking  for negative effects of the tax changes of 1986  and 1990  on 
potential  GDP  and  productivity,  rather  than  on aggregate  demand,  those 
are not apparent  and  presumably  would  take a long time to emerge. 
Perry  and  Schultze  find  that  aggregate  demand  has been weaker  in re- 
cent years than can be explained by monetary  and fiscal policy. The 
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sales, as shown in table 6 of the paper. It is even greater  than  they say, 
because almost all their component  demand  regressions  have negative 
trends  (that  is, disguised  as negative  constants  in first-difference  regres- 
sions, perhaps  unintentionally). 
The recent  persistent  weakness  of aggregate  demand  in this economy 
is a challenging  puzzle. Ours is a low-saving society, and the govern- 
ment is a big dissaver. Real short-term  interest rates have been falling 
since 1989  and  are as low as in the 1960s,  as seen in figure  2 of the paper. 
The stock market  is at levels, relative  to capital  goods prices, compara- 
ble to the 1960s. Why can't this economy generate  enough investment 
to restore full employment?  Is Alvin Hansen to be vindicated  at long 
last? Is high  technology  now capital-saving? 
My further  comments  have four parts. First, I elaborate  the case for 
GDP-gap  dating  of business cycle recessions and recoveries. Second, 
I express some doubts about the authors'  models. Third,  I offer some 
remarks  on credit  crunch  issues. Fourth,  I discuss the employment-pro- 
ductivity-GDP  nexus. 
GDP-Gap  Cycle Dating 
My first  point  is to urge  the authors  and  other  analysts  of the business 
cycle to shift to growth-oriented  dating  and definition  of business cycle 
phases, recoveries, and  recessions. I urge  that  on the chief NBER-cycle 
umpire,  Robert  Hall, who sat beside me at the BPEA meeting. 
Discussion table DI and figure  DI focus on the six cycle periods in 
the Perry-Schultze  paper  and show two different  allocations  of the 149 
quarters  beginning  in the last quarter  of 1955.  The first  part  of table DI 
gives the conventional  NBER dating,  which classifies 34 quarters  as re- 
cession and 101  as recovery. (There  are seven quarters  at each end, oc- 
curring  in incomplete recoveries that began before 1955:4  or had not 
ended as of 1992:4.)  The reason that most of the time the economy is in 
an NBER-recovery  is, of course, that the trend  of real GNP is positive 
and the criterion  of recovery is any two quarters  of positive growth, 
however small. 
The middle  of table DI, in contrast, bases cyclical dating  on the gap 
from potential  GNP. I estimated  potential  GNP to grow at 3.5 percent 
per year through 1973, and at 2.5 percent thereafter.  Its level is fixed 
near  business cycle peaks so that  gaps are negative  in overheated,  infla- George L. Perry and Charles L. Schultze  203 
Table DI.  Alternative Allocations of Quarters to Business Cycle Phases, 1955:4@1992:2a 
Business Cycles  Total 
Specification  I  I1  III  IV  V  VI  quarters 
NBER timing 
Recession begins  1957:3 1960:2  1969:4  1973:4  1980:1  1990:3  ... 
Recession quarters  4  4  5  6  12  3  34 
Recovery quartersb  7  34  11  19  30  ...  101 
Quarters  in previous  recoveryb  7  ...  ...  ...  7 
Duration  of recovery  in progress .  .  .  ...  .  .  .  7  7 
GNP-gap  timing 
Recession begins  1955:4 1959:2  1968:2  1973:1  1978:4  1989:1  ... 
Recession quarters  11  8  15  9  17  14  74 
Recovery quarters  3  28  4  14  24  2  75 
Discrepancies 
NBER recovery versus 
gap recession quarters  7  4  10  3  5  11  40 
Before NBER peak  7  4  6  3  5  6  31 
After NBER peak  0  0  4  0  0  5  9 
Source:  Author's calculations. 
a.  There are  149 total quarters for the six business  cycle  phases. 
b.  Of these,  Perry and Schultze  calculate  four as pre-recession. 
tionary  periods.  It turns  out that  potential  GNP  corresponds  to 3 percent 
unemployment  in the early 1950s,  to 4 percent  in the 1960s,  to 5 and  then 
6 percent in the 1970s, and to 5.5 percent today. The gap is plotted in 
figure  DI, which also indicates  NBER-recession  periods  by shaded ar- 
eas, and marks GNP-gap  or growth recessions by overlapping  cross- 
hatched areas. In those recessions, the gap is getting larger, while in 
growth  recoveries, it is getting  smaller.  By this criterion,  recoveries  and 
recessions account  for virtually  equal  numbers  of quarters. 
The bottom  lines of the table  show the allocation  of the discrepancies. 
They  are most severe for the sixth  episode, the one that  mainly  concerns 
the authors  and  the rest of us. In it are eleven quarters  that NBER calls 
recoveries  and  that  a gap  methodology  would  call recession. Six of those 
are  before  the NBER peak;  five so far  fall after  it. 
Semantic  anomalies of the current  business cycle arise from those 
discrepancies  and  distort  analysis. Prior  to the short 1990-91  NBER re- 
cession, the GNP gap and the unemployment  rate had been rising  for a 
year and a half. Subsequent  to it, the so-called recovery has been too 
slow to cut gap and unemployment  as rapidly  as in previous  upswings. 
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Figure  DI. Real GNP  Gap, 1955:4.1992:4a 
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Source:  Author's calculations. 
a.  The  GNP  gap  is  potential  GNP  minus  actual  GNP.  Shaded  intervals  are  NBER  recessions.  Cross-hatched 
intervals are GNP-gap recessions. 
as an oxymoron if the alternative  cyclical dating methodology were 
used. 
It is especially unfortunate  that the authors used the conventional 
NBER dating.  All their  variables  are fractions  of potential  GDP, which 
has a positive trend.  The core of their  paper  is a submodel  of GDP  deter- 
mination "around  recession" periods. It seems to me anomalous to 
choose the sample observations to which this model applies on the 
NBER dating  methodology,  which  really  presumes  a zero growth  trend. 
The Model 
The authors  rely on a two-regime  model  of the determination  of GDP. 
The regime of central  interest applies to "around  recession" quarters, 
which, in addition  to the NBER recession itself, include  the four quar- 
ters before the peak and the four after  the trough.  The other regime  ap- 
plies to the remaining  observations. 
What  I miss is the logic of this split. Why should  the economy be de- 
scribed  by two different  sets of equations,  rather  than  just one? What  is 
the mechanism  that shifts  the economy from  one regime  to the other?  In 
the paper, those regime shifts are arbitrarily  and exogenously deter- 
mined ex post,  by NBER recession-dating  augmented  by the authors' 
arbitrary  four-quarter  transition  periods. Frequently,  by the way, those 
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A possible rationale  for a two-regime  model would be asymmetry  in 
the effects of up and  down  movements  of the independent  variables.  For 
example,  recall  Goodwin-Hicks  flexible  accelerator  theory. The normal 
investment  accelerator  does not take hold when there is excess capac- 
ity. Idle plant and equipment  must be worked off before the economy 
can return  to the regime  to which the accelerator  mechanism  applies. A 
similar  example  is the looseness of the relation  of employment  and  pro- 
duction  in cyclical contractions  and  early  phases of recovery, discussed 
in connection  with the Robert  Gordon  paper  in this volume. 
Quite a different  reason for separating  "around  recession" periods 
would stem from the old neoclassical synthesis. The recession model 
would  be Keynesian  demand  calculus,  while the remaining  observations 
would  obey classical  full employment  equilibrium  equations. 
Perry  and Schultze do not implement  any of these ideas. They offer 
no theory  for the split into two regimes. In practice,  both specifications 
are pretty simple. GDP is determined  by two policy variables:  the fed- 
eral  funds  rate  for monetary  policy and  the high  employment  budget  sur- 
plus for fiscal  policy. The difference  between regimes  in this regression 
is simply  that the coefficient  for the fiscal policy variable  during  the re- 
cession periods is much higher. This is consistent with the hypothesis 
that the economy is more demand-constrained  in the recession sub- 
sample. 
The Credit Crunch 
A common  hypothesis  about  the current  cycle is that  debt  burden  and 
credit crunch  explain the unusual  sluggishness  of the economy and its 
apparent unresponsiveness to  expansionary monetary policy.  Ben 
Friedman  has covered this part  of the paper  at length, so I can be brief. 
I think  it is extremely  difficult  to conclude  from  observations  of credit 
markets  in what proportions  observed declines in quantities,  whether 
stocks or flows, are due to supply shifts and demand  shifts. It is espe- 
cially difficult  in these markets, where rationing  always occurs at ob- 
served  interest  rates and prices and where other contract  terms are im- 
portant  but unobserved. 
Consider,  for example, evaluations  of risk. If observers cannot cor- 
rect  for risk, they cannot  tell whether  the fact that a business firm  is de- 
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would also have been denied  five years ago. If the economy were more 
prosperous,  presumably  there would be less risk among  potential  bor- 
rowers  than  there  is now perceived  to be. 
A new phenomenon  in the banking  system is capital  deficiency, one 
important  source  of the so-called  credit  crunch.  If banks  are not meeting 
the capital ratio required  and the market  is unresponsive  to equity is- 
sues, banks must curtail  their holdings  of assets to which the required 
ratio  applies, and replace  them with safe assets exempt  from capital  re- 
quirements  or shed an equivalent  amount  of liabilities. The way to do 
the latter  is to increase  the differential  between the rate  charged  on loans 
and the rate paid to depositors. Likewise, as banks shift to safe assets, 
the differential  between  the rates  charged  on loans and  the rate  available 
on Treasury  securities  and  money market  assets will increase. 
Will  the widening  of these differentials  mean higher  rates on loans or 
lower rates on deposits and  Treasury  securities?  That  depends  on com- 
petition  in the open markets,  external  to the banks, in loans, deposits, 
and  safe assets. Substitutability  is evidently  greater  as between deposits 
and open market  assets, including  Treasury securities, than between 
bank  loans to customers  and  open-market  loans to big-name  businesses. 
Consequently, if the Federal Reserve holds money market  rates con- 
stant, then it is a rise in the bank  loan rate  that  widens the differential. 
Whether  the problem  stems from shocks to demand  for or to supply 
of bank credit, a crunch  of this kind can be remedied  by a Federal  Re- 
serve policy that  lowers the federal  funds  rate more than  the Fed would 
normally  do. Unfortunately,  judging  from Chairman  Greenspan's  fre- 
quent  pronouncements,  the Fed has instead  used the credit  crunch  as an 
excuse for not easing  policy more  actively. 
Productivity  and the GDP Gap 
Another  puzzle on the current  scene is whether  the spurt  in produc- 
tivity in 1992  is transient  or permanent.  If more  than  a normal  reversible 
cyclical phenomenon,  it could be either  a one-shot lift in potential  GDP 
or a lasting  increase  in the rate of growth.  The authors  are properly  ag- 
nostic  but are  inclined  to agree  with Robert  Gordon  that  the productivity 
spurt  is just cyclical. I do not know, but I can see some reasons to be 
more  optimistic. 
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in cyclical downturns  because  both  overhead  staff  and  production  work- 
ers are kept on payrolls  in excess of current  needs. Employment  falls, 
but mostly by attrition,  and that takes time. The subsequent  upturn  of 
demand,  sales, and  production  can be handled  without  hiring  new work- 
ers, and  measured  productivity  rises sharply.  Later  in recovery, further 
expansion  requires  hiring,  and  productivity  growth  reverts  to its secular 
norm. 
In the current  business cycle, however, the downturn-especially in 
the growth-gap  dating framework-was  slow and gradual.  There was 
plenty  of time, even before 1992,  for attrition  to reduce  employers'  labor 
forces. Moreover, employers had plenty of incentive to dispense with 
workers, and inhibitions  on layoffs are weaker than  in previous cycles. 
As the paper notes, permanent  job losers are a much larger  fraction  of 
the unemployed than in the past. The epidemic downsizings of large 
firms  involve permanent  layoffs, whose obvious purpose  is to increase 
efficiency  and cut costs. 
If this is correct, what does it imply for the size of the current  GDP 
gap?  How much  more  GDP  would  be needed  to get unemployment  down 
to, say, 5.5 percent? Does the 1992 productivity  news mean there is 
more slack in the economy than  we thought  (or would have thought  had 
we known  the statistical  revisions that seem to indicate  less slack). 
At first  glance, one would say there  is more  room  for GDP expansion 
than  is suggested  by the CBO  potential-GDP  series used by the authors. 
But if the redundant  labor  of the recession has already  been laid  off, then 
rehiring  will be needed sooner in the recovery. One of the components 
of the Okun's  Law coefficient  will be missing. On the other hand, some 
of those job losers may be swelling the ranks of those not in the labor 
force and  may  be ready  to return  whenjobs become available  again.  The 
fact that the participation  rate is abnormally  low supports  this possi- 
bility. 
Jobs are desperately scarce. James Medoff points out that the best 
proxy we have for vacancies-the  Conference  Board  Help Wanted  In- 
dex, deflated  by an employment  index-is  extraordinarily  low relative 
to current  unemployment  rates. At 7 percent  unemployment,  jobs are as 
scarce  as they were when unemployment  rates were much  higher,  as in 
the recession troughs  of 1975  and 1982.  The Beveridge  curve apparently 
has shifted  down vertically. 
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confidence and cautious consumption  spending. It is also probably  a 
brake  on wage  increases, as the Fed should  note. In previous  recessions, 
many observers, including  Federal Reserve officials, have alleged that 
unemployment  was not Keynesian  and cyclical, but classical and struc- 
tural. This diagnosis would be indicated if increased unemployment 
were accompanied  by increased vacancies, as would happen if there 
were more mismatches between them. In unemployment-vacancies 
space, this would be an outward and upward shift in the Beveridge 
curve. That  is definitely  not what  we have today. 
General Discussion 
Robert  Hall defended  the criteria  used by the NBER dating  commit- 
tee to define recessions against  James Tobin's suggestion  that a GNP- 
gap measure  would be preferable.  Hall argued  that the measurement  of 
potential  GNP would become highly  politicized, which would interfere 
with the function of the dating  committee. He recalled  the situation  in 
1980,  when a rapid  bounceback  occurred  after  an initial  short  recession, 
followed by a plunge  into recession in 1981-82.  The GNP-gap  measure 
would have shown only one recession during  this period, whereas the 
NBER method  showed two. Use of the NBER criteria  had  therefore  re- 
lieved political pressure  to describe both recessions as a single Carter 
recession. 
Several participants  took up the issue of why the current  recession 
was so long in coming. Martin  Baily asked whether  it was an overhang 
recession, characterized  by large overcapacity  in certain  types of capi- 
tal. Christopher  Carroll  suggested that the authors had rounded up a 
number  of co-conspirators  who had caused the recession, but had not 
pinpointed  who had actually pulled the trigger. Richard  Cooper pro- 
posed that there was no mystery about the trigger  of the current  reces- 
sion: it was the result  of soaring  spot oil prices following  the 1990  inva- 
sion of Kuwait, which he attributed  to mismanagement  of the strategic 
oil reserve. Consumers  recalled  the effects of the 1979-80  oil crisis; this 
shocked their expectations, lowering consumption. Robert Gordon 
agreed  with  the analysis  that  there  was a hangover  element  to the current 
recession, together  with an end-of-expansion  effect in the labor  market, 
and that the Kuwait shock had been decisive in the onset of the reces- George L. Perry and Charles L. Schultze  209 
sion. However, these did not explain the weakness in two large sec- 
tors-defense  and  construction. 
In response, George Perry  acknowledged  the importance  of the Ku- 
wait trigger  in causing  the recession. However, he pointed  out that the 
flurry  in oil prices was brief and that  both before the invasion  and after 
the Kuwait  war  was over, sustained  overpredictions  appeared  in the re- 
gressions for GDP and most of its major  demand  components. Carroll 
proposed that there were really two issues: first, what brought  on the 
recession and second, what  caused the recovery to be so weak. 
Baily noted the difficulty  of identifying  supply  and  demand  factors in 
the credit market.  The fall in the real estate market  depressed the de- 
mand for loans, while simultaneously  weakening the position of the 
banks, hence squeezing  the supply  of loans. Carroll  was skeptical  about 
a credit crunch  explanation  for the recent recession because it did not 
adequately  account for the drop in consumption,  an expenditure  cate- 
gory  less affected  by credit,  which  was the most significant  feature  of the 
recession. However, Schultze suggested that credit supply constraints 
may have been important  through  a less direct route. If they affected 
small businesses and other firms that typically lead recovery through 
new hiring,  the lack of this new employment  may have restricted  con- 
sumption.  In this connection, Cooper suggested  that banks may be an 
important  source  of funds  for nonbank  intermediaries.  However, Benja- 
min  Friedman  reported  that  according  to the flow of funds  tables, banks 
provide  only 5 percent  of the funds  of nonbank  lenders. 210  Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1:1993 
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